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Prefr,torv note .'oy the UHCTAD secretariat

J.. . r.rhe importance of formulating· policies for dealing with the adverse
consequences 2.ssocia-i;ed with the reverse transfer of technology (brain drain)
has been stressed in several resolutions and proposals adopted recently by the
international cormnunity. The General Assembly~ in its resolution _3362 (S-VII)
of 19 September 1975, Section III, :paragraph 10, pointed to the "urgent need
to formulate national ~nd international policies to avoid the 'brain drain'
and to obvinte its adverse effects". In its resolution 2 (I) of 5 December 1975,
the Committee on Tran3fer of 1l'echnolog;y of illTCTAD requested the Secretary-General
of UNCTAD to "carry out studies assessing the magnitude, composition, c.:,,uses
2.nd effects of ·the outflovr of trained personnel from the developing countries 11
and to "convene a g-roup of gover:;1D1ental experts to examine the studies and to
submit, if :possible, recomi:nendations to the Cornmi ttee on Transfer of Technology
2,t its second session" (paragraph 9 of the resolutior1) ~ In its resolution
87 (IV), adopted in Nnirobi en 30 Y.uiy 1976, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development recommended (in paragraph 18) that all countries,
p&.rticularly those benefiting- from the brain drain, should, in the light of'
UHCTAD's work on reverse transfer of technology "consider what measures may be
necessary to deal with the problems posed by such outflow ••.•• ". Similar
resolutions and recommendations hP.ve also been adopted in other United Nations
forums, particularly, ILO, WHO ancl IDIBSCO.
2.
The present study, prepared by Professors Pomp and Oldman, examines some
of the legal and aculiinistrnti ve implications of policy proposals designed to
transfer gains from brain drain to the developing countries. At this. stage, the
dbcusnion is· of a very pr91imin2.ry naturci and merely attempts to outline the
1,ain problem areas rather than to suggest solutions.

3.

The study is one of several.being presented to the Group and f'orms part of
UUCTAD' s continuing effort to improve understanding of the brain drain problem,
its economic and soc .. J.l. iuplications and the policy options facing the
international conununity. In ·i;he _p.Lanfling 01.· this study, the UNCTAD secretariat has
benefited considerably froin the co-operation of the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs of the United tfations Secretariat.
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Sunm12,ry 2-nd. conclusions

4.' This study discusses the J.og2,l and a<1'11inistrati ve implications of transferring
to the developing countries part of the benefits accruing both to the migrants and
to the developed countries from the reverse tranofer of tecl1nology (orain
drain). The term "brain drain" is usod as a portmanteau expression to indicate
the migration of professional, technical, and kindred persons (PTKs) from the
developinrr to the. developed countries. Though this definition accurately
describes a large element of the brain drG.in, it is restricted in a number of
respects. 1' irst, countries 2.re not neatly divided into developing and
developed. A colmtry th2.t is classified 2.s a developing country for son::.e
purposes may be considered as 2, developed country for other purposes. Second,
not all PTK mirration occurs lJetvreen tho developing and developed countries.
Migration occurs amont5 the developing countries themselves and amonc the
developed count1~ies themselves. 'I'hiTd, ths term PTK is too restrictive; for
some develo:9ing countries, ·the brain drain n.::cy consist in part of businessmen,
and international civil servants, persons not usuc:,lly classified o,s PTKs. For
some countries, the loss of mc:npow~r may co,.1sist more of unskilled labour than
of brain drain.
7

5. The terms developed 'country, developing country and PTK, despite their
over-simplification, are nonetheless usefu.l in f::·aminc the debate, since they
serve to indicate the basic nature of the underlying problems without detracting
from the general applicability of the discussion.
6.
Vvhile a rn.:unber of f2.ctors can be identified that contribute to the
mig-ration of PTKs, there seems little doubt that since the mid-1960s, the aim
of the major developGd countries of innnigTation ho,s been to discriminate, whether
or not within the context of overall quot2. limits, in favour of PTICs to the
detriment of the unskilled. The attitude of the United States, shared by
other developed countries, has been express0d succinctly by a former Secretary
of State: 11 We are in the international market for brair~s." 1/ Hot surprisingly,
during recent years PTKs from thG developing countries havo cone to represent
an increasing perccmt2.ge of inm1igration into the developed countries, thus
causing- concern over the effect this loss of manpower is having on the economies
of the developing countries.

7.
The causes of the brain drain are complex, and a munber of remedies have
been suggested at various times for dealing rri th the pro1)lem. Some suggestions
involve direct or indirect restrictions on the flow of migration from developing
to the developed countries. Those restrictions, however, raise serious conflicts
vri th basic rights und.er 2. humanitarian international order and for that reason
are precluded from consideration. Hore recently, it has been suggestGd that a
part of the benefits arising from thG brain drain ought leg-itimately to be
transferred to the develo11ing' countries. In brief, the proponents of this argument
rely on the basic pJ::-inciple that in a vrorld of imperfect mobility, individuals
rrho are able to migrate ought to share some part of their increase ct benefits in
order to improve the welfare of those left behind. The ar::;wnent io strengthened

1/ Quoted in United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain:
A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Ilobili ty, Washington,
United States Government Printing Office, 1974, :p.36.
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to the ext'.:mt that hie-her or· specialized edu.c2,tion, an essential requirement
fo;r mi{rra,tiort -into · ,Jst developed cou:c1tries, is accessible. on:.;:- to the children
o{ the politic2,l anc1 econ01:1ic •.Hi.ts, or tl1020 livi:r..g in tb::· ur )an areas. If a.
lack of equal educational opportunit;i,r exists, thoce able to migrate exercise a
:privilege or an exclusi vely--held 2,dvantage and should share their incree.sed
benefits with tho3e l2;cking the some o~Ypurtuni ti0s for ed:.1c0,tional and economic
advancement. J\Ioreover, i:i: the dovelopinc couniir? incurs losses due to the
migration, as seems likely, th8 ,;killed m:igrr:,nt o:;_• the hoot clGveloped country
ho,s an additional oblil5'ation to share t:iwir b-e:1efi ts in ordei~ to compens2.te
:for th0 welfare losoec cxpor5-enced b;y the dcvelopine country. Recent
contributions to the Ii to:rature on th2 bi~ain d.ro,in consist of efforts by
economists to identify the: n::-,tm~e and co:mposi tion of the various types of
losses associated with sl:illocl 1dgration. Though difficult to q_u2,ntify,
these losses provide 1-1n indeponclcnt basis on Yrhich to justify thG proposals
discussed in this study.
1

Y .

8.
The proposals discussed in detail in the body of the stud3r fall into three
major categ-ories; (1) Tax incentives to encourage migr2.nts (as well as
non-migr2,nts) to m2lrn volunta:1:y contributions to special internationo.l human
resource funds (IHii.F) i'or use in the devclopins countries; (2) A supplementary
tax: on PTK income in the developed country of ir.illligTation, the revenue from
which vrould be used to augmEmt the net transfer of resom·ces to the
developing countries; and ( 3) An assessment on host develo_Rcd countries in
recognition of the b::mefi to accruing to them from migrc:c.foii.. The resources
raised thereby boi.nfr simila:.~ly tTansferred to the developing countries. As
will be seen, the proposals are, to some extent, interdependent and are
presented as a package. However, each proposal examined is on its own merits
and can be adopted separately or in combination with the other proposals.

y

Despite the short period it has been under considera ti,,n, the argument .
that a part of the benefits of the brain dr2in should be transferred to the
developing countries has received comprehensi 'Te analytical treatment. The
Reverse Transfer of Technology, Economic Effects of the Outflow of Trained
Personnel from Developing Countries~ Stud,r by the UNCTAD secretariat
('m/B/Ac.u/25/Rev,l) United Nations Publication, Sales No. E,75II. D.l, and
"The Reverse Transfer of Technology. 1ts Dimensions, Economic Effects and
Policy Implications: A study by' tho UNCTAD secretariat" (TD/B/C.6/7),
Geneva, October 1975. See the accompanying paper prepared for UNCTAD by
J.N. Bhagwati entitled "The Reverse Transfer of Technology (Brain Drain):
International Resource Flow Accounting-, Compensation Taxation and Related
Policy Proposals" (TD/B/c.6/Ac.4/2), in which the economic implications
of the brain drain for the developing countries are analysed. other
comprehensive references include: J.N. Bhagwati and M. Partington (eds.),
Taxi
Brain Drain: A Pro osal, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Co., 1976; J.N.
ed. The Brain Drain and Taxation: Theory and
Empirical Analysis, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976.
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9.

Subsequent sections of this study set forth the legal and administrative
difficulties surrounding the implementation of these proposals and discuss their
optimal formulation. The remainder of this section briefly summarizes the
proposals and provides backgTound information that may help tq ~lace the
discussion in its proper perspective.

A.

Voluntary contributions to international human resource funds (IHFRs)

10. This proposal (discussed in chapter I) can be dealt with briefly here.
The suggestion is that tax incentives ought to be provided by the developed
countries to enable migrants, their employers, and all other tax payers to
ma.~e voluntary contributions to recognized organizations or to especially
created international hwnan resource funds (IHFRs). j/ If, as is believed,
migrants and the firms that employ them are generally willing to make some
contribution to the developing countries in recognition of their moral
obligations, the level of contribution may be significantly enhanced by such
incentives. The assumption is that the tax incentives wili induce a response
by taxpayers,' including non-I'ligrants nho have an interest in the developing
countries, that exceeds the sacrifice in revenue attributable to the tax
incentive. The sacrifice in tax revenue arising from the grant of tax
incentives can properly be regarded as a contribution by the developed country.
The proposal is particularly attractive since it entails no restriction on
migration and is completely voluntary on the part of the donors. In developed
countries that already provide tax incentives for charitable contributions
within their existing framework, incentives for IHRFs would be a reasonable
means of taking into account the special preferences of the immigrant
population.
E.

A supplementary tax on PTK earnings in host developed countries

11. The second proposal, a supplementary tax on the income of PTKs, was
first suggested by Professor Bhagwati in a pioneering article published in
1972. !J Proceeds from this special tax would be used to augment the net transfer
of resources to the developing countries. Le~al, constitutional· and
administrative issues are comprehensively treated in chapters II, III and the
appendix of this study. However, certain aspe.cts of the proposal are dealt
with below to clarify any possible misconceptions.
1.

Restricted international mobility and its implications for the
brain drain

12. Developed countries commonly restrict immigration both quantitatively,
through ·annual quotas, and -qualitatively, through various criteria that
tY})ically favour skilled over unskilled migrants. Because of these restrictions,
the opportunity to migrate is a privilege extended
a favoured minority
in the developing country. It seems proper that those who benefit from the

to

2/

This idea was first proposed by the authors in 0, Oldman and
A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal",
World Development, Oxford, vol,3. No, 10, October 1975, pp.751-63.

R. Pomp, "The Brain Drain:

M J. Bhagwati, "The United States in the Nixon Era;
Innocence", Daedalus, Autumn 1972.

The End of
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exercise of this privilege should shars part of their gd.n in order to increase
the welfare of tho,,9 who remain behind in the develc,ping couE-tries. Taxing
part of the increased benefits can, in one sense, be vievied 2,s an extension
across national frontiers of the principle of progressive taxation. Nor is this
a radical innovation in taxation 9 since it is acceptable under international
custom for countries to assert tax jurisdiction over nationals abroad,

13,

The restrictions that·each developed country imposes on entry may
reduce immigration to 2, level below that which would exist in the absence of
all controls, producing an element of "rent" or "surplus 11 in the income of
each skilled migrant, This rent or surplus could be taxed without affecting
overall levels of migration. If the rates were chosen carefully, the tax
would 2,ccordingly have no effect 0~1 migration, and this should increase the
attractiveness of the. proposal.

14,

Al though overall migr2,tion might not be affected, the tax might however
reduce the size of the waiting list (i.e., the excess demand) for entry
into the developed country. A significant reduction in the size of the
waiting list might, inter alia, have the desirable effect of reducing the
domestic supply of PTKs vri th a concomitant savinfrs in education costs and
a reduction in salaries.

2.

Comparisons with an exit tax

15, It is im}Jortant to stress thd the proposed special tax on skilled
migrants is intended as an assessment on their developed country incomes
only after migration has taken plE,ce. It differs radically from an exit t~,
which requires pa;yment of the te,x prior to emigration.
In a country where
the rate of private savings is insignificant, any non-neslig·ible exit tax would
be prohibitive, except for individuals having access to foreie:n capital
through person2,l coY'.tacts. Moroover, since g_n 0xi t tax is a c:1ce-for-all
levy only, it would involve a lump sum payment of some ma137-1i tude which could
be discriminatory in its effect. By contrast, the proposed supplementary
taJ, is clearly superior. It would not be a prerequisite of emigration but
would be levied annually for a limited duration on the PTKs income in the
developed country which could be used to pay the to.x. Most important, the
proposed tax conforms closely with existing patterns of international
tax3,tion.

c.

An assessment on developed countries

16.

The third J:)roposal, discussed in ch2,pte1° IV, relates to 2,11 assossment
on the developed countries of irn.1uigration, as opposed to the migrants, in
recognition of the benefits 2,ccruins to host populations from irnn1igro,tion.
The 2,ssessment would be based on 2, formula. In cases where the assessment
did not reflect adequately the flow of PTKs between specific pairs of
countries, supplementary bilateral agreements could be 1,rovided.

D.

17,

A sarrrple packa_g£

The three sepa,r2,te proposals d.iscussed briefly in paragraphs 10 - 16
could ideally be considered as part of a total package combining elements of
the three in different proportions reflecting the preferences of the parties
conc9rned. Vfuile one pa,rty might emphasize chaneres in developed co1.L.1try tax
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·

11:nw to encourage volunt;_ny contributions, anotlle:c might
its
support for t,:>oxing I)TK3 directly, and still 2.nother might ci ve top priority
to government payments to intE:rnational hULE1l1. resource funds ( IHRFs) in
recoenition of the benofi ts fortuitously recei vod by the developed countr;y
.:10 a resnl t of the b:r2,i11 drain.
A sample pad::2,gc me,;y thus consist of;
) A modest intern2.tiom'.lly levied br2.in d.r2,in t2.x, say c,t a rcte between
and 10 per cent~ levied 2.0 a surtax o~ the t2-:x paid to the developed countries
by a defined class of :t'J:Ks foi· a period of not more than 10 years after they
first reach leveltJ of income sul,ject to the tax. The period oi' 10 years is
suggested in order, on the one
to o.llovr
cient time for PTKs to
reach significant levels of inc0i11c 2nd, on the other h2,nd, to cut off a
PTICo tax li2;bili ty once a c 1 1'ust1:cnti2.l number of ;:/et.rs has cone oy.

5

(b) A modest interm,tion;.l :J.ssessment on eo.ch develo1Jed country receiving
a brain drain flovr from the developin.s- countries estim2.tcd to exceed a
defined and trien_Ylially revised £loor firure.

(c) The crcntion of specii:,lly chartered organiz?.tions - designated
as Internationo.l Human Ile::;ource Funds (II-L.lF) - under developed country 2.nd
developing count:c;i,r au:::;pices in conformity with a model IIillF to ba prepo,Tcd
and continually revised in accord vri th internationally
procedures.
The or13T111izatiorn:1,l st:ructu..re of tl10 proposed funds coLlld be designed
fairly easily. However, tho technical design of "both the brain dTain tax and
the intern2.tionecl assessment schmno rrould re
aclC:Li tiona,l legal ano,lysis,

18.

further qualitative ar12,lysis in me2,suring o..nd ectimating o,ppropri2-te levels
of tax and 2-ssessnent to achieve dosircc:. levels of :cevenue, o,nd the
out of a host of administ:r2:-ti ve pTobleDs before o..ction could be taken b;y
nation&l and international bodies. The appendix to the present study
illustrates some of the problems <',nd their coii1ple:xi ty.

TD/B/C. 6/AC._4./7
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Introduction

19. The study is' di vided into four m2-in chapters. Chapter I examines the
main is st.ms involved in insti tilting- 0:.1. scheme· for voluntary contributions
to specially created Internt.tional Human Resource Funds (IHR.Fs) i the
proccedo of such funds co~1ld be used for financing specified projects in
cfoveloJiing countries e::cperiencing the brain drain. The first part of
chu:pter I outlines ways of organizing such a scheme and the possible uses to
which the fund's resources may be pt,t. 'i'he second part examines the kinds of
tax incentives or ben2fits that nay be offered to potential contributors in
order to ensure their maximum participetion in the proposed scheme. Criteria
for .elicibili ty for tax incentives arc also c1iscussed.
20. Chapte1· II analyses various al terns ti ve approaches to lE:vying a
supplement2-ry tax on the income earned in the developed countrie·s by sldlled
migrants f:com the developing countries. Section A provides a brief introduction
to international income tax rule3, and serves as u background for the subsequent
discussion. Sections Band C discuss two poosible approaches to applying . a
supplementary tax on the br2.in drains (a) a tax levied by the developing
countries and collected by the host developed countries, and (b) a tax
levied and collected oy the developed countries n.nd channelled to the
developins· countries . The discussion highliehts the legal o.nd ad.mini strati ve
problems of imi)lcmentation •.
21. Chapter III e.xrunines the possibility and fcc::..sibili ty of introducing 2.n
international brain drain tax (IllDT), .::1s v. way of avoiding- come of the lesal and
admi1:.istrative problems discussed in chapter IL In particular, this chapter
identifies the i~ole international org2.niz2.tions, such a.s the United Nations,
can play in overcoming these problems and in effectively implementing an IBIYr.

22. Chapter IV exarn.ines briefly the modalities for levying a speciD..l
international G..ssessment on host a.evclopec1 countries in reco;311i tion of the
lJenefits that these oountrio:3 derivG from the immigration of ·skilled manpower
from the devel oping countries. Thie proposo.l vroulcl be the easies t to
implement as it ymuld not involve any of the juridical and administrative
intricacies that charo..cterize other proposals discus::,ed in the study.

23. Finally, the appendix conk.ins an in-depth analysis of the main structural
issues in the dcsirn of an international lJrain d.J.~ain tax (TBDT).

24 • . A summary and the main conclusions which emerge from the analysis are
presented in parag--raphs 4 - 10.
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Chapter I
Volunt~~

contributions

created intc~national
IHRFs

25.

The proposals discussed in this study would be expected to lead to an
· .,.
increase in the resources available for transfer to the developing countries.
These resources could be transferred either to the developing country
governments directly or to developing country projects through the disbursements of intermediate organiza.tions, here called International Human Resource
Funds. Such Funds may be recipients of voluntary contributions from private
individuals or of proceeds raised through taxes or through assessments on the
governments of developed countries as later noted in chapters II 1 III and IV.

A.

Organizing and using IBRF s
1.

Hou organized

26. One or more of such Funds might be created in accordance uith international
practice as organizations \Ji th defined powers to receive and spend funds.
UNICEF is a prime example of this today. IHRFs might also be created under
the laws of any particular regional organizations. The developed countries
might create or charter IHRFs. Current examples are the United States and
United Kingdom Commi ttecs for UNICEF, through ,,,hich voluntary contributions in
those countries are funne:lled to UIHCEF. Finally, some developing countries
might decide to charter IHRFs to attract funds for special projects.
27, The legal characteristics of these organizations constituting IHRFs
would vary some\·rhat depending upon their source of authority, but 2-ll of
them would have certain basic features in,cornmon. They uould be exempt
from truces on their receipts, and in many, if not all~ A.8ses voluntary
contributions made J_') e.pproved IHRFs vould 1'1enefit from tax c c lcessions of
the sort described in section :B of this ch;:i,:pter. An IHRF uould have to be
non-profit in the sense that its resources could be used only for stated purposes
and not. for commercial investments. 1i111c governing structure of IHRFs would need
to be specified in the charters and 11ould be tailored to facilitate decisions in
allocating IHRF :resources in accord with stated charter · purposes.
2.

Stated purposes 8nd uses of resources of IlIRFs

While International Human Resource Fur1.ds should be able to allocate their
resources to general development purposes or generc1,l education purposes, many
might prefer specially designed programmes prepared for such Funds. A
particular programme might conGist of research designed to counter the brain
drain itself. Another might focus on training people to develop the capacity
to carry out that special research. nesources could also be channelled into
programmes aimed at strengthening the domestic technological capability of
developing countries or into socially-oriented projects. In any event~ it
might be desirable to have a multiplicity of Funds and decision-making groups
for the formulation of spending programmes.
28,

29. While the present study does not focus attention on the uees of IBRFs,
it shou~d be obvious that the success of 2ny means of raising Tevenues for the
Funds will be largely dependent on the articulation of Fund objectives and
the manner and degree of their implementation. For exainple, 8 ny one or more
of the following may be usefully incorpora.ted in the stated purposes of IHRFs:

TD/B/C. 6/AC. 4/7
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30.
the
the
and
the
and
B.

9

(a)

To fund specific research and training programmes in developing
countrieP or regions \Jith purposes limited to develnpment of
personnel capable of r::o:nducting developing-country-oriented
technological development 7

(b)

To fund other specific research and training institutions in
developing countries or regions;

(c)

To provide general support for research on the development of
developing country technologies;

(d)

To provide general support for educational institutions in
a_eveloping countries; and

(e)

To receive funds from private voluntary contributors (individuals
and juridical persons), from the proceeds of any International Brain
Drain Tax discussed in chapter III below, and from proceeds of any
assessments levied directly on the governments of the developed
countries as discussed in chapter IV bel0\1.

These purposes are directly related to the principal motivations behind
drive to mitigate the causes and adverse consequences of the brain drain moral obligations of PTK migrants and the countries and organizations where
for which they work; the losses suffered by the developing countries; and
need to reduce the brain drain flm, by such measures as reorienting research
education in the developing countries.
Kinds of tax incentives or benefits for contributors to IHRFs

31. Private individuals and business firms in recognition of the obligations
for real economic benefits Teceived from tb-, brain drain flou can be expected
to make voluntary contributions to IHRFs designed to achieve agreed purposes.
The amounts of these contributions might in turn be significantly enhanced by
offering tax advantages to contributors. In so far as these advantages to
taxpayers might cause some revenue loss to tbe developed countries, the estimated
amount of sucb loss might properly be regarded as a contribution by the developed
country rather tban by the taxpayer. The expectation is that this sacrifice of
tax revenue by the developed country uill induce contributions by taxpayers
which exceed, by more than the sacrifice, the contributions tbey would have made
to IHRFs without the tax incentive. There is no easy way of knowing, however,
whether or not the excess will occur or hou large it might be. 'j/
32, The remainder of this section examines types of tax incentives for
contributions and some of the range of existing practices. Studies of existing

5./ See N. Feldstein, "The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions",·
28 National Ta.'< Journal, 81-100; 209-226, March and July 1975, and see also,
H,H. Hochman and J .D. Rodgers, "The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions", 30 Natione,l Tax Journal 1, March 1977.
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tax incentives for contributions to philanthropic institutions appear in the
Cahiers of the Intc,:-national Fiscal AssocL-tion §/ and the documents produced
in 1970-1971 as a 1·esul t of the efforts of the International Standing Conference
on Philanthropy (IIITERPHIL) a Geneva-based association of philanthropic
organizations.]/

1.

Tax deductions

33, Individual taxpayers in some developed countries (e.g. the United States,
the United Kingdom PJld tbe Netherlands) are allowed to deduct from their
texable income the amounts contributed to qualified charitable organizations,
subject to a limit 1 such as 20 per cent or 30 per cent of their income.
Amounts contributed in excess of the limit are not deductible from income.
The
the individual I s income tbe higher the rate of tax paid on marginal
increments. of income under the progressive income tax systems prevailing in
developed countries today. The ref ore, the greater the income, the larger will
be the tax sav
realized from the
to deduct a charitable
contribution. Put another vay 9 the greater the taxpayer's income the
will be the tax inducement to give more to qualified institutions 1 such as
International Human Resource Funds. For those wi ,:;h higher incomes the deduction
approach is a
tax incentive than the credit approach discussed below.
2.

Tax credits

34.

A tax incentive ma.y be given in the form of a direct subtraction from
income tax otherwise due rather than. a subtraction from income before calculating
the tax. This form of incentive is usually called a tax credit or simply a
credit. The amount might be, for example, 20 per cent of the amount donated to
a International Human Resource Fund. For a person in the 20 per cent rate
bracket of income taxation, this credit uould be equivalent to the tax saved by
allowing a deductirin from income for the el"tire amount of a $100 donation.
For a person in thL 30 per cent bracket, a deduction of $100 ,,.rould produce a
benefit of f/30, ,1hile a tax credit of 20 per cent of the $100 donation would
produce a tax ·benefit of only $20. Tax credits give equal tax benc,fits to
virtually all taxpayers contributing the same amounts. Por the same amount
donated a tax deduction gives 2. larger tax benefit to higher income taxpayers
than ·louer income taxpayers; at tbe same time, the deduction gives more
incentive to higher income
to give larger amounts.

§/ Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (Studies on International Fiscal
La\1), Volume 54b: 11 The possibilities and disadvantages of extending national
tax reduction measures, if any, to foreign scientific, educational or
charitable institutions 11 •
]/ For example i see INTERPHIL (International Standing Conference on
Philanthropy), Draft European Convention on the Tax Treatment in Respect of
Certain Non-Profit Organizations, Report presented to the (.;ouncil of Europe,
March 1971, Strasboui g.
0
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3.

Combinations of deductions and credits

35. The taxpayer could be given the choice, under specified limitations, of
either deducting his donation from his income or of crediting a percentage of
his donation against his tax liability. At the present time, the United States
gives this option to individuals for donations to political parties or
candidates for political office, but the maximum credit is $25 (i.e. 50 per cent
of donations up to $50), and the lllr-J.ximum deduction is $100. For any taxpayer
\-Those tax bracket exceeds 25 per cent the deduction may be advantageous if he
id shes to give more than $50 for political contributions.
36. An internationally proposed scheme could adopt a carefully chosen set of
limits on credits and deductions, giving the taxpayer a choice betueen
deducting or crediting, in an attempt to optimize or in any event increase the
amounts donated to IHRFs by persons at all income levels.
4.

Business firms

37. A number of business firms, from the large transnational corporations to
small professional firms, benefit from employing FTKs and would be willing to
make contributions to IHRFs. Such contributions might ·be induced and increased
by allowing deductions or giving credits. The United States allows deductions
for contributions to qualified charitable organizations provided the
contributions do not exceed 5 per cent of the firm I s net income. The Si·1iss
National Government also allows business corporations to deduct small amounts
of charitable contributions as bu::;iness expenses. For some countries it may be
expected that business firms could deduct reasonable amounts of contributions
to International Human Resource Funds as business expenses in the nature of
research and development expenses which may ultimately result in increased
business profits.
38. At any rate business firms are a proper focus of attention for the scheme
since many of them are direct beneficiaries of brain drain from the developing
countries.

5.

International civil servants

39. While a number of United nations or other international employees may feel
morally persuaded to make contributions to International Hu.inan Resource Funds
(witness the Geneva-based United Nations employees' 1 per cent fund for
development), the amounts of these contributions might be significantly increased
if matched in some way by adjustments in the complex scheme for compensating
such employees. For example, if a brain drain tax is adopted and extended to
international civil servants, so as to burden their net base salaries, then a
credit might be given against this tax for a portion of voluntary contributions
made to IHRFs. The credit might range from 20 per cent to 50 per cent of the
amount of the donation depending upon the particular employee I s 0 staff
assessment".
6•

Earmarking

40. The motivation to give larger amounts to IHRFs might well be stimulated by
allowing contributors to designate or earmark thei:i. contributions for
expenditure on certain projects or in certain countries or both. Smaller tax
incentives m~y be needed to induce a given level of donations if the donors
have some choice in designating the use of the amounts donated. Some IHBFs
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(in UNICEF, for example) might offer a range of project 2nd location choices
and even offer opportunities to donors to help design projects. Other Funds
might be specialized by country or type of project, so that contributors make
their choices by selecting their preferred Fund.

41. Precedent' :for earmarking of contributions already exists within the
United Nations family in the op2rations of UJ:HCEF. Donors may earmark their
donations for particular objectives, projects, and countries on the UNICEF
programme agEnda.
42.

Giving donors an influence over project design and location may offer

ne1.1 opportuniti.es for 0:q)erim::mtc,tion in dealing 1-1ith the cntir·e complex of

brain drain related problems.

7.

Existing practices in the developed and developing countries

43. As indicated earlie1', some surveys of practices with Tespect to tax
incentives for contributions to recognized voluntary funds have been made by
private international groups. These surveys need to be examined and extended
in order to bring to light the full variety of available techniques in giving
tax incentives for charitable contributions as well as the prevailing extent
and level of such incentives. For examr,lei the tax provision of the
Federal Republic of Germany, uhich permits churches to have taxpayers who are
rnPmbers of churches pay up to 10 per cent of their income tax li2,bility for the
support of religion, needs to be ·examined as a possible technique to be
recommended for use in certain countries. '§/ A developing country suffering
substantially from brain drain might find such a technique helpful and adaptable
for the provision of sums to an Intem2tional Human Resource Fund iri th
objectives especially tailored to solving that country's problems.

c.

Eligibility for tax incentives

44.

One of the potentially more important advantages of the voluntary approach
to providing revenue for International Human Res01.1.rce Funds is that eligibility
for the tax incentives for voluntary contributions to.such Funds need not be
limited to the class of persons designated as PTKs. Any person, organization,
or country concernecl about or interested in de2.ling with the brain drain proble:n
could make contributions i a.rid most of them could be eligible for one of tbe
tax incentive allowances. Eligibility may be virtually unlimited e.s long as
organizational design and regulation of IHF§s is adequate to the task of
preventing abuses in their spending pattec~1s.
D.

The problem· of ttremittances 11

45.

A number of per.sons from the developing countries living in the developed
countries or working abroad aa international civil servants remit sums to
relatives and others on an entirely vcluntary basis. Some of these remittances

§./ See Harvard LaH School International Tax Program, World Tax Series:
Taxation in the Federal Republic of Germany (prepared by Henry J. Gumpel),
Commerce Clea.ring House, 2nd edition, Chicago, Illinois, 1969, para. 12/1.8.
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might be used for solving brain
problems and might be regarded as
satisfying the moral obligations of FTKs or as providing flows of money
which in part compensated for losses incurred by the
drain. Will
these remittances be curtailed arid. shifted to tax-induced donations?
Will such shifts be desirable? Can they be detected and
Or
should it be assumed that such remittances are so
personal that they
are unlikely to be affected substantially
the development of International
Human Resource Funds?

46. There are no simple answers to these questions and more research is
needed. But it may be worth noting that much of the remittence f101;1 comes
from the unskilled group of migrants. 1.1/hile this group is not covered by
the present study, it may be safely expected that the proposals discussed here
a.re unlikely to affect the flou of remittances.
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Chapter II
Leg.:_,l and administrative as2ects of bra.in dra.:.,1 taxes

47. This chapter analyses various approaches to levying _a supplementary tax. on
the income earned in the developed countries by individuals who emigTate from t:,he
developing countries.
Section A provides as a background to the subsequent
discussion a brief introduction to international income tax rules.
Sections B
and C discuss two possible a.pproaches to applying a supplementary tax on the brain
drain~ a tax levied by the developing country and a tax levied by the deveJoped
country.
The discussion highlights the legal and administrative problems of
implementation.

A.

Jurisdictional issues in general

48. Many of the legal issues raised by a brain drain tax a.re jurisdictional in
nature.
That is, they involve the rules governing the extent of a country's
taxing power.
At the outset, therefore, it is important to consider the scope
of these powers.
49, In general, countries have exercised self-restraint in asserting their tax
jurisdiction.
The practicalities of enforcement and the fear that a broad
assertion of jurisdiction might offend foreign governments have kept countries
from exercising their taxing powers in wa:ys that ,10uld create conflicts among
countries.
Accordingly certain pa.tterns of taxation have evolved that a.re
acceptable a.s a ma.tter of international custom. 2/ Some aspects of the brain
drain tax, may, however, go beyond existing practice and raise questions
concerning the limits of a country's tax. jurisdiction.
Since the outer limits
of a country's jurisdiction are often not clearly defined, 1SJ./ only sketchy and
tentative answers can be given to some questions at this stage.
50. In order effectively to assert jurisdiction to tax incomEo, a country must
rely on some minimum connexion or nexus, between itself and the income being
taxed. 11/
In terms of this nexus, tax systems can be classified into two ma.jar
groups:
schedular systems and global (or unitary) systems.
Under a pure

<J/ Many countries are parties to bilateral tax treaties that modify each
country's usual pattern of taxation.
An objective of these tax treaties is to
reach agreement on the acceptable scope of ea.ch country's tax jurisdiction.
Non-tax. conventions can also affect a country 1 s tax jurisdiction in special
situations.
The International Convention on Diplomatic Relations, for example,
provides a tax. exemption in the country of employment for income earned by foreign
diplomats.
1Q/ Compe.re Martin Horr, "Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income",
Tax Law Review, Vol. 17, 1962, p. 431, with Stanford Ross, 11 United States Taxation
of Aliens and Foreign Corporations~ The Foreien Investors Tax Att of 1966 and
Related Developments", Tax Law Review, Vol. 22, 1967, p. 363,

ll/

Norr, op. cit. p. 432.
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schedular system, the jurisdictional connexion is the sources of the income. 11/
Only income from domestic sources is taxed; no jurisdiction is asserted over
income from foreign sources.
Since all countries tax income from domestic
sources, any country that uses a schedular system - that taxes only a_omestic
income - exercises the most limited form of tax jurisdiction.
Feu countries so
restrict themselves. 12/

51. In a global system, an addi tiona.l jurisdictional com1exion is the personal
status of the taxpayer.
Jurisdiction is thus based on two independent factors;
the source of the income and the·status of the taxpayer. W
Under most global
systems, residence is the connexion relied on in asserting tax jurisdiction over
individuals.
In a few countries, including the United States; Mexico and

11/
12/

Ibid., p.

434.

A country might limit itself to taxing only domestic income if the
amount of foreign income were insignificant.
Unfortunately, as foreign income
becomes increasingly significant, these countries sometimes find themselves locked
into their earlier approaches.
Other countries may wish to tax foreign income
but may not have the administrative capability of e:n.forcing a. tax on foreign
income.
A small number of countries deliberately exempt foreign income to
increase their attractiveness as tax havens.

W

The global approach focuses on an individual 1 s abi1ity-to..:-pay, as
measured by his totaJ incom.e; .regardless of i.ts. source.
Sincro foreign income·
increases the individual's ability-to-pay, it 1.rnuld be inconsistent to exempt it
from taxation.
By compa.rison the schedular approach focuses on classes of
income.
Different classes of income (wages, business profits, interest) are
commonly taxed at different rates and ,.ri th different exemptions and deductions.
The personal status of the taxpayer is sometimes relevant in determining the rate
applied to the income.
See, "Schedular and Global Income Taxes", in R.N. Bird
and O. Oldman (eds.), Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries,
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1967.
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the Philippines, citizenship alone is a sufficient connexion. 12..i
These countries,
however, also tax nrm-citizens who a.re residents.
That is, either status citizenship or residence - is sufficient for the assertion of global tax
jurisdiction, though the va.st majority of taxpayers are both citizens and
residents.
Countries using a global system tax all income of their citizens and
residents, regardless of its geographic source.
In other words, income from
foreign sources is taxed a.long ,Jith domestic income.
The difference between
taxing on a. residence ba.sis and taxing on a citizenship basis can be illustrated
'oy considering taxpayer A, who is a citizen of country "X".
Assume A moves
abroad a.nd is no longer considered by X to be 2, resident.
If X taxes on the
basis of citizenship, A's change of residence will be irrelevant and X will tax A
not only on income earned ,Jithin X, but also on any income earned abroad.
By
comparison, if X taJCes only on the basis of residence, it will no longer assert
jurisdiction over A on the basis of his personal status.
Thus X will not tax A
on income earned abroad.
X will tax A, however, on income received from sources
Hithin X.
In this case, the source of the income 1.s a sufficient connexion with
the country to warrant the assertion of its tax jurisdiction.
52. Most income tax systems are hybrids, employing some combination of the global
and schedular concepts.
A global system is probably used more often by the
developed countries, a schedular system more often by the developing countries.

12/

See Douglas Sherbaniuk, Henry Hutcheon, and Pearley Brissenden,
"Liability for Tax-Residence, Domicile or Citizenship?'; in Canadian Tax Foundation,
Report of Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Tax Conference, Toronto, 1964,
P• 315,
Administratively, it is probably more difficult to assert jurisdiction on
the basis of citizenship than on the basis of residency.
Although the definition
of residency varies among countries, a person will nomally lose his residence
status if he is outside cf the country for a prolonged period of time.
The
longer the individual is out of the country, the more difficult t4e administrative
problems of locating the taxpayer and verifying his income and ded~ctions.
Countries taxing on fhe basis of citizenship must continue to make these efforts,
regardless of ho\-7 long the taxpayer is outside ·of the country (or regardless of
whether the taxpayer has ever been within the country).
The United States is probably more successful in administering its
citizenship jurisdiction than other countries would be.
Many Americans who work
abroad are employed by United States corporations, and this eases the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) enforcement problems.
Moreover, it is more than likely
that many Americans alternate periods a,broad with periods within the United States.
Knowing they a.re going to return to the United Sta.tes at some future date helps
quench inclinations to ignore United Sta.tes ta.,r obligations while a.broad.
Also,
the IRS stations personnel abroad as part of its office of Internation,3,l
Operations.
The IRS' s presence abroad undoubtedly encourages taxpayer compliance.
Finally, Americans do ~ot easily relinquish their citizenship; thus tax induced
renunciations are uncommon.
In limited circumstances, tax induced renunciations
may be ignored by the United States for purposes of assessing tax liability.
(See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 877).
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The trend in the developing countries, however, is to move toward a more global
approach. li/
Few if any developing countries remain which rely on a strictly
and narrowly define'. schedula.r approach.

53. To gain a perspective on some of the subsequent presentation, it is useful
to realize that countries using a global approach already assert tax jurisdiction
over individuals working a.broad.
Although the primary motivation for adopting
the global approach was not to tax the brain drain, these countries already tax
PTKs as part of their general assertion of tax jurisdiction over all residents
and citizens a.broad.
Ha.ving an existing legal fra.me.rork for taxing individuals
a.broad is different, however~ from effectively administering such a tax.
Most
countries find that the problems of enforcing a. tax on indi.viduals abroad are
considerable.
Furthermore, the type of emigrant who comprises the heart of the
brain drain may not neatly fall within traditional definitions of residency, or
he may think nothing of renouncing his developing country citizenship, thereby
- -.raising jurisdictional issues.
These problems a.re explored in section B.
B.

Developing country taxation of emi~rant PTKs~
1.

Jurisdictional issues

54. In order to levy a tax. on the part of income earned abroad by an emigrant
PTK, the developing country must assert jurisdiction on the basis of the personal
status of the. PTK.
If_ the developing country relies on residence as its
jurisdictional nexus, as do most global type countries, the jurisdictional issue
involved in taxing the PTK is the definition of "resident 11 •
55,

The definition of 11 resident" varies markedly from country to country.
Some countries follow specific rules that define residence in terms of the period
of time a person has been inside or outside the country, thereby avoiding inquiry
into less objective factors.
Other countries decide the question on an almost
ad hoc basis, with 7 i..ttle guidance from sta',ltes.
Often, a r,mbination of the
two approaches is aaopted. 11.I

1.§/ As the income tax becomes more significant in the fiscal structure of
a country, problems of measuring and comparing individual's abilities-to-pay become
increasingly important.
Attention logically shifts to a taxpayer's total income,
regardless of source.
In response to these concerns, a country can be expected
to move in the direction of a global system.
Pressure to adopt a global system
will be increas_ed as foreign investment grows, since a country would want to tap
the revenue potential available from taxing foreign income.
Moreover, if foreign
income were not taxed, inveotors would have an inducement to invest abroad,
aggravating domestic ca.pi tal shorta.ges.

11./ At one end of the spectrum are countries that define residency in.terms
that suggest domicile, e.g., a physical presence in the country coupled with a,n
intention to remain for an indefinite period.
Once this status has been achieved,
it may be difficult for the taxpayer to shed it.
At the other end of the
spectrum are definitions of residency phrased in terms of business connexion with
the country, regardless of whether or not the individual is physically present.
A country may have one set of rules for determining when an individual ceases to
be a. resident.
For illustrations of the approaches some countries use, see
Harvard Law School International Tax Program, World Tax Series (hereinafter WTS):
Taxation in .Australia., Little, Brown· and Co., Boston, 1958, 5/1 i WTSg Taxation
in the Federal Re ublic of German.. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Chica.go, 1963,
2 2; WTS: Taxation in Sweden, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1959, 5/1.
The
definition of resident for citizens or nationals may be different from that for
a.liens.
See WTS: Taxation in Colombia., Commerce Clea.ring House, Inc., Chicago,
1964, 11/1.2. -
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56, Whatever the approach, the ba-c;ic question is: at uho,t point does a PTK
\·TOrking abroad cease to be 2. resident of th0 developing country?
The factors
that most countriec, i/OUlcl consider ar2 the '_ntent of the PTK '.:i th respect tc his
being abroad, the length of his stay abroad;, and the nature of his contacts vith
both countries. ~
For ex2rnple, '" FI'K ,,ho U8.S sent ab1·oad by his employer for
short-term training Hould cle2,rly remain a Tesident of the de"Jeloping country.
In contrast, PTKs vho h2.ve migr2,ted Fa.broad Etre the least likely to all within the
usual concepts of residence.

57. In order to assert jurh1d.ictio:c1 over migrant ?I'Ks, the developing country
has t\TO options.
_The first i,; to defir;.e residence in terms of a person I s prior
contacts with the developing country, even though 2.11 these contacts may have
been severed long ago.
This definition of residence F('Uld be broader than that
so fa.r adopted by any country.
As explained in section A, 2uch a broa,d
assertion of jurisdiction could not be said to violate international law,--but
because it would be out of the mainstrear1 of international c-ustom and practice,
two serious problems could arise.
One is that the developed country might refuse
to recognize the developing country I s rlefini tion 1 especially since it ,rould
-conflict with the developed country's claim cf residence over the PTK.
A
developed cow1try that viewed the developing co;intry' s assertion of jurisdiction
as illegitimate uould obviously not co-operate vith the developing country in
policing the tax on PTKs.
'rhe other is that the developing country's claim of
residence would make little sense to a ?TIC 1:ho had cut 211 his ties with his
country of origin.
He might therefore ignore the claim and refuse to comply
voluntarily 1:ith the tax.

50. In view of the sensitive issues involved, an unorthodox definition of
residence is unlikely to sway public opinion in favour of the tax.
Indeed, in
terms of public acceptance it seen,s crucial that the supplementa.ry i;ax conforms
as closely as possible to existing p2,tterns of taxation.
Therefore, a more
fruitful option is for the developing country to follow the pattern established
by the United State, Mexico, and the Phili/pines, and assert jurisdiction on
the additional basis of citizenship.
3ince these three countries apply
citizenship jurisdiction uniformly to all citizens~ the developing country could

1..2./

~ Ascertaining residency is often a more difficult inquiry than that of
ascertaining citizenship.
But enforcing a tax on the basis of citizenship will
pose greater problems, since the taxpayer ma.y have little, if any contact with
the country.

1.2/

In some countries, the taxation of the foreign earnings of a nonresident citizen may conflict with constitutional doctrines proscribing
legislation ha.ving an e:xtra-terri torial effect.
l<'or example, some Ca11adian
constitutional-law scholars felt that, prior to 1931, Canada was precluded from
enacting legislation having an extra-territorial effect.
In 1931, the Canadia..r:1
Parlia."llent acceded to the Statute of Westminster, which expressly authorized such
legish.tion.
The Statute of vTestrninster clearly established the power to tax.
non-resident citizens on their foroign income, though Cana.do has never chosen to
exercise this power.
(See Sherbaniuk, Hutcheon, and Brissenden, op.cit., p. 316).
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not limit citizenship jurisdiction to just PTKs without encountering serious
problems.
The singling out of emigrant PTKs for special treatment, .assuming this
was consistent with the developing country's domestic law, would raise delicate
problems under international law. '£2/
·These problems, like those arising from
an unorthodox definition of residence, W would present obstacles to obtaining
the administrative assistance of the developed countries and to obtaining the
voluntary compliance of the PTKs.
Moreover, other reasons exist for the
developing country not to iimit its citizenship jurisdiction to PTKs (see B,5
below and section A of the appendix).
59, Unlike an unorthodox definition of residence, the adoption of citizenship
jurisdiction is within the mainstream of international custom and practice.
Certainly the United States would find it avkward to criticize the developing
countries for modeTling themselves on its 0vm pattern of taxation, despite the
difference in motives.· The precedent provided by Mexico and the Philippines
should also help to silence public criticism.
2.

Renunciation of citizenship by the FTK

60. The developing country's assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of
citizenship might induce a P'l1K to renounce his citizenship in order to avoid
developing country taxation.
Though one result would be a revenue loss to the
developing country, another, more important, consequence would be a lowering of
the probability that the PTK would eventually return to the developing country.
Imposing an income tax on non-resident citizens might therefore not be in the
developing country's best interests to the extent that it resulted in wholesale
renunciations of citizenship.
61. Could the developing country ignore a PTKs renuncia.tion of citizenship, a.t
least for the purpose of asserting tax jurisdiction?
Again, international law
offers little guidance since no country has attempted such a broad assertion of
tax jurisdiction. 'l1/
But two cases can be distinguished.
An individual who
renounces his citizenship can either acquire a ne\·J citizenship or else become
stateless.
The developing country's assertion of tax jurisdiction over the PTK
once he has acquired citizenship in the developed cmmtry would raise the same
problems as an unorthodox definition of residence.
In contrast, any developing
country policy that discourages persons from becoming stateless in order to avoid

'£2/ The developing countries domestic la1,r may also prevent the singling out
of PTKs for special t2x treatment.
21/

An assertion of citizenship jurisdiction by the developing country might

also be viewed as creating a conflict between the h;o countries.
The short
answer is that countries accept certain coriflicts as being legitimate and
inevitable.
The conflict between citizenship jurisdiction and residence
jurisdiction is, by custom and practice considered acceptable.
The conflict
created by an orthodox r!.efinition of resident v1ould, however, not be considered
legitimate.

'l1/ 'fhe United States has a provision designed to discourage citizens from
giving up their citizenship and moving a.broad in order to avoid United States tax.
(Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 877),
The special tax. imposed on expatriates
extends only to their United States investment income and income effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.
No
attempt is made to tax their foreign earnings that have no connexion with the
United States.
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2J/

taxation. Fould seem rec1.sonable.
Thus one approach the developing country
could
would be to recognize the :2TKs renunciation of citizenship only if he
obtained a ne'r cit
•
In the ca.so of "' ?TK vho had emigrated to the
United St::ites, the developing country could levy its tax for at least five· years,
uhich is the length of time an immigr2.,nt must normally wait before applying for
United States citizenship.

'lJJ

62.
If the developir.g country 2sserh, tax jurisdicti:Jn over the PTK during' his
first five years in the United. St2,tes, the PTK uould have nothing to ga.in from
renouncing his citizenship.
From the developing country's point of view, hm·1ever,
limit
taxation to a five-year period rna,y reduce potential revenues.
The l?TKs
early year:2. in a developed country might not be productive in terms of income,
especia.lly if he spends pa.rt of the til:le in college.
Ji'urthermore, the PTK may
be able to reduce his income during this period by working- under a deferred
compensation agreement.

63, Devising rules to minimize ta.x avo1.da.nce through renunciation of citizenship
is difficult, and no one nolution appears to be completely satisfactory.
This
problem might best be handled by an internation2.l agency, like the United Nations,
for exa.mple a.s possibly the most appropriate body to develop rules for taxing
PTKs vho have surrendered their citizenship.
6~. The problem of wholesa.le renunciations may, hovever, prove to be a.
academic one.
A supplementary a_eveloping country tax that imposes only a modest
burden on the ?TK is not likely to result in renunciation.
RenU,nciation would
also be unattra.cti ve to a PTK 1:.rho Hi shed to retain close family links uith his
country of origin, or to a ;JTK who wa.s uncertain about his future plans.
Moreover, cultural and social patterns a,re likely to influence a PTK 1 s decision;
the strength of his ties to the developing country might oubreigh the tax savings
from renunciation.

3.

Relief from double tax~dion

65. International double taxa.tion cen result when 2 taxpayer or his income has
,jurisdictional connexions with more than one country. 2.§./
Since a developed
country will tax a "J?TK on inco,ne earned ·1-ri thin the country, double taxation ,rill
occur if the developing country alcm taxes the J?rIL

_gj/ See Paul Weis, r;'I'he United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness1:, 1961, International and Com-iJarati ve Lm1 Qua.rterly, Vol. 11
(1962) p. 1073,

W

Such an approach vould be sir.cilar to tho United StateG Gammon Law rule
that a person does not lose one clomicile until he has acquired another.

£2.I

Under certain conditions (e.g. marriage to an .American citizen), the
waiting period may be less th2. .n five years.
Professor Bha,guati
s that the tax be converted into a capitalized sum
at the time of a change in nationality.
It is, however, questionable whether the
United States could constitutionally help the developing country collect this sum.
See footnote 41 below.

2f2/ International double taxation commonly a.rises when one country taxes an
individual on the basis of residency or citizenship and another country taxes the
individual on the
s of the source of the income.
Double taxation can also
arise if two or more countries consider the taxpayer as their resident or national,
or consider the source of the same it em of income a.s being within each of their
territories,
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66. Suppose a ::?TIC has taxable income of US $20,000 derived entirely from
Assume that the United States tax would be
employment within the United States.
levied at an effective rate of 25 per cent, resulting in a United States tax
liability of US $5,000.
I;f the developing country levies its regular income tax
on the sa,me base, 'll/ US $20,000, at a.YJ. effective rate of 45 per cent, the
developing country tax lia,bility would be US $9,000.
The total tax burden on
the PTK 1 s earnings vould be US $14,000 (US $5,000 plus US $9,000), for an over-all
effective rate of 70 per cent.

67. As the example illustrates, the burden of double taxation can be quite
onerous.
Mc,st countries that tax foreign income therefore use some type of
foreign tax credit mechanism to provide relief. W
Among the coimtries using
the credit method described below are~ Canada, Gre_ece, The Federal Republic of
Germany, India, Israel, Ja,pa.n, Mexico_, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Other countries may agTee to grant a
credit for taxes paid to countries 1·1ith which they have tax treaties.
The
United States, for example, requires its tax treaty partners to grant a credit
to their residents for income tax paid to the United States~
68. A foreign tax credit is a unilateral method of eliminating double taxation
by allowing the country of source the prior claim on the income.
In its simplest
form, a credit mechanism wo.uld require that the taxpayer compute his tax liability
2nd then take as a credit aga.inst that liability the a.mount of any foreign tax
pa.id on the income.
The PTK in the example vould take a credit for the
United States (the country of source) tax of US $5,000, thereby lowering his
developing country tax liability from US $9,000 to US $4,000.
From the
United States point of view, the PTK has no foreign income and thus cannot take a
credit age.inst his United States tax liability.
In other words, from the
United St2tes point of viev, the developing country has no prior claim on the
PTK 1 s income since the developing country is not the country of source.
The final
result is that the PTK pays tax to the United St;ates at a rate of· 25 per cent and
to the developing country at a rate of 20 per cent. W

']]/ The developing country uill determine the PTK 1 s taxable income according
to its own definition.
This determination of the PTK's taxable income does not
have to correspond with that of the United States.

W Other methods of eliminating 6r reducing double taxation include
granting an exemption for all foreign source income (or perhaps limiting the
exemption only in ca.ses llhere the foreign income Fas subject to a. foreign tax),
granting a deduction for foreign taxes, or applying a reduced rate of tax to
foreign income.
£l/ The text greatiy simplifies the credit device. Questions that must be
answered in designing a. credit device include: What types of foreign taxes a~e
creditable?
What kinds of limitations a.re needed to prevent the foreign tax
credit from reducing the country of residence I s tax on domestic income?
How
should double taxation be defined?
Hov should foreign income be defined?
The
United States has developed a sophisticated set of rules that govern the use of
its foreign tax credit.
See, Elisapeth Owens, IJ.'he Foreign Tax Credit (Cambridge,
:VlA~ Harvard Law School, International 'l'ax Program, 1961).
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69. In short, as long as the developing country tax ra.te is higher than the
United States r:s.te, the credit results in t;:,,x being paid to the developing country
at a, rate equal to the excess of the effective developing com.try rate over the
effective United States rn,te (the 20 per cent finaJ. result in the example).
As
long as the PTK 1 s earnings are high by developing country standards, the effective
developing country tax rate uill probably exceed the effective United Sta.tes rate,
and it will therefore receive some tax revenue from the ?TK.
Should the
United States ra.te be higher then the developing country rate, however, the credit
for taxes paid tc the United States 1rill exceecl a.nd thus cancel the developing
country tax liability.
If the rates in the example Here reversed, the ?TK would
pay US $9,000 in Udted Sta.tes tax, and credit this fcreign tax against his
developing country liabiJ.ity of US $5,0(\j,
Under these circumstances, the
developing countr,r would receive no ta,x revenue from the ?TK.
If the United States uished to increase unile.terally the amount of revenue
collected by the developing country, it could deviate from longstanding practice
and g-rant a credit for the developing country.tax.
In the preceding example where
the United States tax iJa,s initially US $5,000 and the developing country tax was
US $9,000, a. credit for the developing country tax would eliminate the
United States tax-liability and the developing country vould collect the full
US $9,000.
The credit uould thus have the effect of transferring Ufi $5,000 from
the United States to the developing country.
Where the r·ates were reversed, and
the PTK had an initial United States tax liability of US $9,000 and an initiaJ.
developing country ta.x liability of US $5,000, a credit for the deveJ.oping country
tax would reduce the ?TK 1 s United States liability to US $4,000 and ,10uld allow
the developing country to collect its tax liability of US $5,000 without increasing
the overall tax burden on the PTK.
Again, the credit would have the effect of
trarisferring US $5,000 from the United States to the developing country. Granting
a credit for a developing country tax levied on income Hhose source was ~-,i thin
the United States would logically have nothing to do with a rational policy of
relieving double taxation and could be vie,,red as simply a means of transferring
revenue to the deve:i oping country; in othe ,, words, a foreign ;iu programme
carried out through a technical change in the rules governing the foreign tax
credit.
Using the foreign tax credit f0r channelling foreign aid may not be
unprecedented, however.
During the 1950s, the United States Treasury Department
took the position that levies ir::rposed on United States oil producers by the Arab
oil producing countries uere t2.xes rather than roya,l ties.
J3y characterizing the
levies as taxes, ,,rhich ccula. be credited ag.s,inst United States taxes, rather than
a.s roya.lties, which could only be deducteJ as a business expense, the result was
to transfer ta.x revenue from the United States to the oil producing countries
,,ii thout increasing the overal1 ta.x liability on the producers.
Ori tics argue
that the levies were properly royalties but were incorrectly characterized as
taxes in order to aid the oil producing countries 2,t a time uhen more explicit
forms of foreign aid would have been unacceptable.
The royalty versus tax
issue is currently under re-examination in the United States.
70.

71. If the goal of the developing countries is to mBximize revenue, th€Y ha.ve the
option of not allowing a. credit for foreign taxes.
Noreover, no 1)rinciple of
international law requires a, country to provide relief from the burden of double
taxation.
Indeed, if a developing -~ouncry 1c1Emted to increase 1;he economic
cost of the 1?TK 1 s d.ecision to work abroad, it would adopt no relief provisions
,-,ha.tsaever.
The lack of any relief provisions might, havrever, be counterproductive in a revenue oensc, because it would. encourage the PTK to evade or
a.void the developing country ta.x.

29./

:ldJ

Norr, op.cit., p. 438,
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72, In deciding whether or not to adopt some method of relief, the developing
country has· to consi1-er the a.tti tude of the host developed country, especially if
it will need assistance from the developed country in enforcing its tax:.
The
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany,
all of which use the foreign tax credit as a mea.ns of relief, might not be willing
to help enforce a tax uhose burden they deemed excessive,
If the developed
countries were sensitive to the effect of the developing country tax. on emigration,
the best course for the developing country might be to adopt some method of relief
as a precondition to requesting administrative assistance from the developed
countries.

73. The credit mechanism eliminates only the burden resulting from double
taxation.
As the effective developing country rate in the example (45 per cent)
indicates, the PTK 1 s income in the developed country makes him 2.ppea.r quite
affluent by standards in the developing country.
A salary that is considered
to be no more than adequate by United States standards may well thrust the PTK
into the developing country's upper tax brackets and a. developing country income
tax that would be appropriate if the PTK were living in the country could border
on being confiscatory when measured. against the cost of living in the developed
country, .21./
Thus the relief afforded by the credit mechanism might not be
sufficient.
Instead, the developing country might consider adopting a special
rate structure for taxing foreign income.
(See B,5, below and Paxt C of the
appendix.)
4.

Tax base

74. The example used to illustrate the uorkings of the tax credit mechanism
assumed that the PTK 1 s tax base, that is, his taxable income, was the same under
both the developing country and United States la1-1.
But the developing country
will normally determine the PTK 1 s tax base under its domestic law.
And just as
the developing country's usual rate schedule may produce unsatisfactory results
when applied to a. PTK working abroad, it may not be possible simply to apply the
developing country's normal rules and principles governing income, deductions,
ca.pi tal allowances, exemptions, 2nd so forth to a PTK working abroad.
Rules that
work reasonably well in the developing country may be totally inappropriate or
have unintended consequences when a,pplied to unfamiliar transactions and business
practices in the developed country.
These issues are pursued in greater detail
in the appendix,

11,I

The extension of a country's tax. system to foreign income can "be
defended on grounds of tax neutrality, which requires that a country tax foreign
income in the same manner as domestic income (with a. credit for foreign taxes).
Decisions whether to invest abroad rather than domestically will thus be
·
unaffected by domestic tax conside:cations resulting in the efficient international
allocation of capital.
It is tempting to extrapolate from this case and argue
that the extension of the developing country tax system to PTKs abroad maintains
tax neutrality and economic efficiency.
When a taxpayer resides a.broad, however,
the principle of neutrality would tend to break down since the developing country
tax rate schedules are designed in the context of the developing country's cost
of living, salary levels, and income distribution.
As the example in the text
suggests, the developing country rates ma.y become coni'iscatory when applied to
a PTK in the developed country unless, of course, combined with relief for
double taxation.
·
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75.

P..n entirely different approach, discussed in the following section, is for
the developing country to use the developed country's tax base.

W

5.

Rates of tax levied by a developing- country

76. The amount of developing countr}' tax lia,bility has a strong bearing on
taxpayer compliance, as well as on many of the other problems discussed above.
Al though some PTKs may not co-operate with the developing country under any
circumstances, the behaviour of most 11ill be influenced by the size of the
developing conntry' s supplementary tax on their foreign ea,rnings.
If the burden
is not unreasonable, the PTK will be less likely to renounce his citizenship or
use other means of evading or a,voicling the tax.
Furthermore, the developed
country may be more likely to assist the developing country in collecting the tax
if the rate is low enough not to influence the PTK 1 s a.ecision to emigrate or
constitute a. hardship Hhile he is living in the developed country.
'rhus
considerable thought must be given to designing the developing country rate
structure.
77. The appendix provides a detailed discussion of the ap1,roaches avdlable in
designing a rate schedule applicable to taxpayers abroad,
One approach would be
to ignore the PTK' s presence abroa,d a:r1d apply the developing country's normal,
domestic tax rates.
As Has illustrated a.bove, this approa.ch is likely to lead
to an overall tax burden on the PTK that may be onerous by developed country
standards, even if relief is provided through a, credit for taxes paid in the
developed countries.
78, A second approach would be to design a specia1 rate schedule applicable only
to PTKs a.broad.
Idea.Hy, this special schedule should take into account the
Pl'K's tax liability in the developed country; therefore, a Geparate set of rates
would have to be developed for each developed country.

79, The most promiiing approach would see: to be for the dcv loping country to
levy a surtax on the amount oi' the J?l'K 1s tc:1.x liability in the developed country.
Under this app:roa,ch, the P'J1I( ,,rould calculate his developed country tax liability
in the usual way.
To calculate his developing country tax, the J?TK would multiply
his developed country liability by the amount of the surtax.
If the developed
country tax liability were US $1.000 and the rate of the surtax were 10 per cent,
the developing country tax uould, be US )noo (U,S $1 ~ 000 X 10 per cent).
80. The surtax may appear initially to be onJ.y a variation of the second
approach, whereby a separate rate schedule is designed for ea.ch developed
country.
But the surtax differs in a, major respect.
The separate rate
schedules designed under i;he second approa.ch would a.pply to the PTK 1 s tax base
as determined ,under the developing country 12,w.
The surtax, hmrever, is a
function of the developed country tax, which in turn is dependent on the developed
country rules and principles governing the c2.lculation of the tax base:
While
the surtax approach may work satisfactorily with some, if not most PTKs, special
cases could pose difficulties.
(See Part B.l of the appendix.)

32} Uot all developing countries use an income tax.
Using the developed
country's tax base would be especially attractive for these developing countries,
since it avoids the necessity of designing their O'¼'Yl tax base.
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f.

Administrative considerations

81. Policing a tax on resid.er..ts and citizens living abroad creates problems even
for a sophisticated tax administration such a.s that of the United States.
Since many developing countries la.ck an effective tax ccllection machinery, the
assertion·of citizenship ,jurisdiction may cause severe enforcement problems.
In
countries plagued by low tax-payer mora.li ty and lacking experience in the taxation
of foreign income, the problems 1,,.rill be compounded.

82. A developing country using a pure schedular-ty-pe system will have hac1. no
experience in taxing·foreign income.
Furthermore, the reason the country uses
a schedular-ty-pe system and taxes only domestic income may be that its tex
2dministration is not capable of administering a globa1 system.
A developing
country usine!' a global-type system, however, will have had some experience in.
taxing the foreign income of its residents.
Despite this experience, it will
find it harder to enforce a tax· on the foreign income of emigrant P1'Ks than on
that of residents.

83. The willingness of ?TKs to comply with the tax laws of their countries will
depend on the loyalties that they feel.
On the one hand, some l?TKs may feel a
deep moral obligation to repay the developing country for the educational or other
opportunities afforded them.
On the other hand, ?TKs may constitute a most
recalcitrant group of tax payers.
Some may fail to see the equity aspect in a
tax burden that, exceeds that of their colleagues in the developed country.
Others, ,rhose prima.ry motive for leaving the developing country was to escape
political, religious or social oppression may have no intention of contributing
to the costs of a government or society with whose policies they disagree.
Those
forced to emigrate as a. result of the lack of professional opportunities in the
developing country may also be opposed.
Secure in the belief that the developing
country does not have e2.sy access to their financial affairs in the developed
country, certa,in T:''l'Ks may feel confident to file a tax return containing false
infomation.
Ind.Led, a PI1K who has cut all ties with his cc·c1.ntry of origin may
see no need to file a return at all.
Obtaining accurate informa,tion about
a '?TK's taxable income is the first problem a developing country faces in
administering a tax on non-residents.
Once the .?TK' s ta..-s.:- liability has been
determined, the secor:d problem lies in collecting the amount owed.

3J/

84. In order to obta.in the info:cmation necessary to access a recalcitrant PTK,
the developing country may engage in some form of unilateral action.
For example,
a. developing country tax administrator could go to the developed country and
conduct his own investigation.
'11his approach is ob,:iously expensive; moreover,
the developed country may regard the tax administrator's presence as an intrusion
on its national sovereignty.
For these reasons, unilateral action is rarely used
unless Targe amounts of revenue. are involved. }4/

n/ The fa.ilure to receive returns from taxpayers abroad is a problem that
plagues all countries.
See John Surr 1 11 Intertax: Intergovernmental Co-operation
in ·raxationn, Harvard International Law Club Journal. Vol. 7, 1966, p. 203,
24,/ ~- , p. 182. Internationci.l lav! may prohibit a country from exerting
ony administrative activities within another country without special permission.
See A. Radler, Corporate Taxation in the Common Market, Part IV, in Guides to
European Taxation, Vol, II, (mimeograph), Amsterdam 9 p. IV-A."5•
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85. A more effective and less expensive approach open to the developing country
is to enlist the co-operation of the develc1ed country's tax cidministration.
If
the desired information is not already available, it will be easier for the
developed country 1 s tax administration to make the appropriate investigation than
for the developing country's.
Furthermore, the PTK 1 s knowledge that the
developing country can readily obtain the relevant information will encourage him
to comply with the tax laws cf his country by filing an accurate return in the
first place.
86. The United States, like most developed countries, does not exchange tax
information on an informal bn,sis.
Information is exchanged only u..rider conditions
specified in a tax treaty.
The actual information exchanged varies from treaty
to treaty.
Certain readily available information, such as ~ list of foreign
taxpayers receiving investrcent income from which United States taxes have been
withheld, may be routinely exchanged, especially if such information ha.s already
been compiled for United Stc1.tes tax purposec.
Non-routine information, for
example, information on a specific taxpayer, must be specia.lJ.y requested by a
foreign governme~t and usually will be supplied only in certain limited
circumstances.
In pra.ctice, the number of individuals about whom information is
exchangea is not large. Yi/
87. Once the ?TK's tax liability has been assessed, the developing country is
faced with the problem of collecting the tax owed.
The problem may be simplified
if the PTK has assets within his country of origin held as security against his
tax liability.
But if the PTK has removed alJ. his assets to the developed
country, the developing country has four options.
It may (i) ignore the tax. owed
until the PTK returns, if everi (ii) use non-tax measures as leverage to
encourage payment of the tax; (iii) collect the taY through the developed
country's courtsi or (iv) have all administrative assistance agreement with the
developed country.
88. The first o:pt~on p-rovict.es the PTK wit.;. an obvious disinc.:::ntive to return to
his country.
Even if the ?TK were to return, his accumulated tax bill might
outstrip his financia1 resources.
This option also has the disadvantage of
putting the PTK in the position of being able to negotiate for a. lower tax
lia.bili ty as a co11di tion of his returning.
89. The effectiveness of the second option depends on vhat measures for applying
pressure on the P'rK a.re a,vailable to the developing country.
For example, the
PTK may have to ask the developing country to renew his passport or his medical
or engineering licence, a.;1d the developing country can refuse to co-operate unless
the P'rK' s tax liatili ty has been satisfied. 22.1/
90. The third option ma.y not be a.vai1able to all developed countries.
11he
British~ Canadian and American courts, }1/ for example, may not recognize a foreign
tax judgement, appa.:rently on the tbeor;r tha.t a tax is aE assertion of a foreign
country's sovereignty which another independent countr:r could not admit within its
borders.
A sirniJ.ar argument is sometimes made that taxes are closely connected

32!

See Elisabeth Owens, ,:United States Income Tax Treaties~ Their Role in
Relieving Double Ta.xation", Rutgers Law Review, Vol.- 17, 1963, p. 450.

36/ Compare the Venezuelan use of certificate.s of solvency; see
F'atri~ Kelley and Oliver Oldman (eds.), Reaciirnrs on Income Tax Administration,
Foundation _?rass, Ivrineola, Neu York, 1973;, pp. 510-15.

YI)

See~ e.g., United States -of America v. Harden, 41 DLR (2d) 721, 1968.
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with public policy and foreign relations; by ruling on the ~,a.J.idity of foreign
tax1;;s, -the judiciary might embe.rass its own countJ'.'y or the fc~eign country. 2§/

91. The fourth option, engaging the assistance of the developed country's tax
administration, is the most effective one.
Since the developed country has
jurisdiction both over the ?TK and over his assets within.the country, it is
obviously in a position to brihg to bear the full weight of its own collection
machinery.
A tax administration that is asked to provide collection assistance
may either (i) refuse all collection assistance; (ii) provide some collection
assistance informally;· or (iii) agree to undertake collection assistance only
in accordance with a formal commitment.
92. Several tax administrations have refused to engage in intergovernmental tax
collection assistance of any kind. -:t1/ A country that feels it would gain very
little through such co-operation will not wish to expend its limited
administrative personnel in collecting taxes on behalf of a foreign country, .4Q/
Other tax administrations may, under certain circumstances, informally help
another country collect its taxes.
If a PTK does.not dispute the amount of
developing country tax assessed, a developed country tax administration might send
him a letter demanding that he pay the amount owed.
This apparent joining of
forces by the developing and the developed countries could be enough to frighten
the taxpayer into paying, even if neither the tax administration nor the courts
were to take any action if the PTK ignored the letter.

93. The United States does not engage in collection assistance on an informal
basis.
Any collection assistance offered by the United States - or, for that
matter, by most Western European countries - is in pursuance of a formal
commitment contained in a tax treaty.&/
Most treaties have explicit provisions
pledging each country's assistance to the other in the collection of taxes, but
assistance is usually limited to situations in which taxpayers wrongfully seek

.2§/ Surr, op.cit. p. 222. For criticism of this doctrine, see
Lawrence ·Robertson, nExtraterri torial Enforcement of Tax Obligations 11 , Arizona
Law Review, Vol. 7, 1966, p. 219,
Although the United States courts will not
enforce foreign tax judgements, they will, under certain conditions, enforce
non-tax judgements.
The United States cou:rt must be convinced (1) that the
foreign court had proper jurisdiction to issue the judgement; (2) that ·a fair.
trial was conducted under c1 system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administra:tion of justice; ( 3) that the judgement was not procured by fraud;
and ·(4) that the underlying ·cause of action is not contrary to the public policy
of the United States.
See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law,
Second~ Conflict of Laws, American Law Institute l?ublishers, St. Paul, Minn.,
1971, § 98; see also Monrad Paulsen and Michael Sovern, '"Public Policy" 'in the Conflict of Laws', Columbia. Law Review, Vol. 56, 1956, p. 969.

3:l./

Surr, op.cit., p. 220.

AQ./ This feeling was also echoed in recent conversations between the authors
of this study and officials of the United States Internal Revenue Service.

W ··Historically, the United States has not entered into collection
agreements, or exchange of information agreements, independently of a tax treaty.

to obtain treaty benefits. !J1./
The case of a PTK who has failed to pay taxes to
a developing country does not constitute s'.wh a situation.
0nly one recent
,, _
31
United States treaty provides for assistan.:e under more gene:;:al circumstances. !LU

94. The use of collection assistance agTeements is a rela.ti vely undeveloped area..
Over and above taxpayer resistance to such provisions, which is undoubtedly an
obstacle to their adoption, _4Y difficult policy questions must also be resolved.
For example, under what conditions can one country refuse to assist the other in
the collection of taxes?
If a developing country levies a tax only on nonresidents who a.re PTKs, and if a similar tax would be unconstitutional if enacted
by the United States, should the United States nonetheless provide collection
assistance to the developing country?
How can the taxpayer be protected against
arbitrary conduct by the taxing country?
The lack of agTeement on these issues
has hindered intergovernmental co-operation in the collection of taxes.

95. As this brief survey of existing practices indicates, some precedent does
exist for international co-operation in the exchange of tax information and,
to a much less extent, i~ the collection of foreign taxes.
The limited amount
of co-operation now being offered, however, would clearly be inadequate if more
than just a few PTKs failed to comply with the developing country tax laws.

96. Assuming a developed country was willing to offer broader assistance than
usual, it might not do so without the assurance that other developed countries
were similarly inclined.
Otherwise, ruiy developed country that was competing
with other developed countries for special types of PTKs, such as doctors, might·
fear that its enforcement efforts would only divert immigration to those countries
not willing to.offer the same assistance.
Wb.ether all the developed countries
.could come to an agreement on the appropriate amount of assistance without
detailed international negotiations in
forum such as the United Nations, is
doubtful.

a

7.

A syntheais

97.

A developing country ta.x on residents and citizens working abroad would be
compatible with existing jurisdictional concepts of taxation.
The legal
struct~~e therefore exists for a developing country to levy a tax on· the brain
drain • . The problem of administration is to evaluate whether or not the
developing countries can achieve the level of enforcement necessary to implement·
the tax.
The factors to be considered in making this evaluation a.re~ (a) the
over-all· efficiency of the developing countries r tax administration; (b) the
developing countries' prior experience with taxing foreign income; ( c) the
_
existing level of taxpayer morality; (d) the social and economic conditions that
generated PTK emigration; (e) the developing countries' access to the assets of

W E.g. "Each of the Contracting States shall endeavour to collect such'
taxes imposed by the other Contracting State 8 ,s-will ensure that any exemption
or reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention by that other. Contracting
State shall not be enjoyed by persons not entitled to such benefits. 11
Article 27, United States-Japan Tax Treaty •

.42/ "The two Contracting States undertake to lend assistance and support to
ea.ch_other in the collection of the taxes to which the present Convention relates
••• in ca~es where th~ taxes are definitely due according to the laws of the
State making the application. 11
Article 27, United States-France Ta:x Treaty.
_4Y Elisabeth Owens, op. cit.,

p.

451.
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emigrant PTKs; (f) possible renunciation of citizenship
PTKs in order to avoid
the tax; and (g) the host de'leloped country's attitude to1;.ra.rd assisting- in the
collection of foreign taxes.
Most developing countries will require substantial
assistance from the host developed countries in administering the tax; yet little
precedent exists so far for such Fidespread intergovernmental co-operation,
although there seems to be scope for doing so through a process of internationally
conducted
iations.

C.

Taxation of PTKs by the developed countries

98.

The alternative to a developing country tax is for the host developed country
to levy a special tax on PTKs.
'rhe tax could be collected as part of the
developed country's usual procedures but i:-:ould be separate from the tax revenue
that would
se go to the developed country rs treasuriJ.

99.

In the case of the United States, a, special tax on PTKs might raise serious
constitutional problems.
Even if the legality of a United States tax on
PI1Ks were beyond question it is doubtful whether Congress would
such a tax.
Furthermore, it is hard to
other developed countries adopting the tax.
It is a,lso easy to overstate the administrative simplicity of colle·cting a
developed country levied tax on PTKs.
There may be a number of problems involved
in actually administering such a proposal.

A2/

~

us
426 us
413

Graham v. Richardson, 403 US 365, 1971; Su1<arman v Dougall,
In re Griffiths, 413 US
717, 1973; Hampton v Mow Sun Wong

634; 1973;
87, 1976.
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Chapter III
Ari int~rnational brain drain tc:.x (IBDT):

some cnnsideration~

100. Many of the _issues rais.ed in the preceding s~ctions could best be resolved
in the institutional framework provided by an international organization, such as
the United Hations system. This part, therefore, attempts to identify the role
an international orga."lization, such as the United Nations could play in
overcoming these problems and in effectively implementing an international brain
drain tax ( IBDT). No other f arum provi·des a· mechanism for balancing -the d-i-v.erse
interests of the developing countries, the developed countries and the PTKs and
for reccmciling possible conflicts between the revenue raising brain drain
proposals and internationa,l law. In view of the serious administrative and
enforcement problems encountered by a developing country acting unilaterally;
effective implementation of the proposal is likely to occur only under the
auspices of an international organization.
101. Participation by the United Nations system could take a number of forms. As
a start, developing countries could be infoTined about their authority under
accepted international custom to levy a special tax on their residents and
nationals abroad. The United Nations could sponsor research distilling and
analysing the experiences of the United States, Mexico, the Philippines, and
other countries that tax on the basis of citizenship. The research could serve
as the basis on which to provide technical expertise necessary in overcoming the
problems discussed above. Just as important, the United Nations could provide a
forum through which the host developed countries could. co-operate in helping to
enforce the developing country tax. It could also play a more active role in
order to assure the widespread adoption of an international brain drain tax (IBDT)
by rendering assistance in designing, implementing and adopting the IBDT, rather
than leaving it to the initiative of the individual countries. Without the
active support of the international community, through such a body as the
United Nations, fears of adverse reaction might make individual developed countries
wary of co-operat_cng unilaterally with tk developing count :es.
102. What forms might the IBDT take? If it were desirable for the IBDT fo conform
as closely as possible to existing patterns of taxation, the IBDT could be
presented as a way of assisting the developing countries in exe:rcising their
rights to assert tax jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship. Under this version,
thE: IBDT would be seen as a simple extension of each developing ~ountry's domestic
tax system to PTKs abroad, thus allaying fears of a new internationally levied
global tax. The primary role of an international organization, like the
United Nations, could be that of a catalyst, establishing a dialogue between the
parties and providing assistance in overcoming technical and legal obstacles.
Viewed in this manner, there would not formally be "an IBDT" as such, but rather
the assertion by each developing country of tax jurisdiction on the basis of
citizenship, accompanied by the increased co-operation of the developed country
tax administrations in enforcing the developing country tax.
103. Support for this ve~sion of the IBDT might come not only fr9m those who saw
it as a reasonable response to the problems of the brain drain, but. also from
those who viewed it as a worthwhile change in tax policy for other reasons• In
fact, the proposal could be treated as a technical change in international tax
practice, thus laying less emphasis on its origins as a, response. to the brain
drain. For example, the proposal could be presented in the form of a
multilateral convention on the enforcement and collection of foreign taxes.
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104, However presented, there may be little enthusiaom for enforcing a developing
country tax if the PTK 1 s migration was in response to religious or political
bppression, or harsh social conditions. Even vigorous advocates of a PTK's moral
duty to share his increased benefits with t.i:10se · 1eft behind i1. the developing
country. might be troubled oy .i'unds being transferred in such cases. Dealing with
this problem raises sensitive political problems. An exemption for political, and
similarly situated, refugees would seem attractive, and the administrative
modalities for operating such exemptions would have to be carefully considered.
105. A more fruitful approach might be to distribute the IJ3DT revenue using other
criteria. An obvious one is to distribute the funds on the basis of need. "Need"
can, of course, be measured in many different ways and different indices are
likely to lead to a different ranki:r:,g of developing.countries (though some
developing countries will appear rela.tively rich or relatively poor regardless of
the indices chosen).
106. Developing countries receiving funds on the basis of need, however, will not
necessarily be those countries experiencing a brain drain. If the relationship
between need and the brain drain becomes too attenuated, the brain drain proposals
might come to be seen as a foreign aid programme. Should the debate over the
proposals become a debate over foreign aid, the persuasive value of the unique
moral and economic underpinnings of the proposals will be diminished.
107, Because of these considerations, many developing countries, PTKs and
developed countries might prefer .a scheme that earmarks the revenue generated by
the IBDT for spending on brain drain (or education) oriented projects, similar to
the IBRFs proposed with respect to the charitable contribution. Transferring
revenµe .to the IHRFs created for charitable contributions, or to specially
creat'ed IBDT IHRFs will distinguish the brain drain proposalG from a more general
foreign aid programme and should appeal both to persons who want to use the funds
to compensate the developing countries for their losses and to persons who view
the brain drain pro~osals as a means of redistributing income and wealth. PTKs
may also be more li .ely ~o favour a progran:.,1e that was projec \-oriented rather
than country-oriented. These optiuns are, however, not mutually exclusive. Part
of the brain drain revenue could be allocated on a country-by-country basis,
taking into account both "need" as well as PTK emigration. Part of this allocati.on
could, in turn, be earmarked for specific projects with the remainder left
unrestricted. The revenue that was not allocated .on a country basis could be
earmarked for specific projects or specific countries or both.
108. Once the simple connexion between the PTK and the country receiving the
revenue has been broken, there would be no logically compelling reason to view the
tax as simply an extension of the developing countries' tax jurisdiction to
nationals abroad: The supplementary tax could then be treated as a truly
international brain drain tax, and the international community would be free to
decide through negotiations ho\v best to design the IBDT. The appendix pursues
some of the structural decisions that have to be made. It is useful, however, to
present at least one version of the IBDT to illustrate how it might be
implemented. For illustrative purposes, therefore, assume that the IBDT is levied
as a surtax on the PTK's tax liability in the developed country, an approach that
presents fewer problems than do the alternatives discussed in the appendix.
109. At a first glance, a surtax appears simple to ad.minister since it is based
on the developed country tax. One would suspect that it could be easily
implemented by simply adding a line to the existing developed country tax
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return. j§_/ This administrative simplicity is deceptive, however; in many
respects, administering a surtax applicable only to some developed country
taxpayers, that is, only to PTKs, rather than to all taxpayers is e9-uivalent to
the adoption of an entirely separate tax. The ad.ministration must ,i) modify or
prepare special tax forms; (ii) compile and update the roll of taxpayers subject
to the tax; (iii) design special withholding tables and instructions; (iv) develop
current payment programmes for the self-employed and other taxpayers not subject
to withholding; (v) plan taxpayer information programmes including the
preparation of descriptive pamphlets and mass· education programmes concerning
filing requirements; (vi) write regulations and rulings that interpret the
statute; and (vii) train officials to answer questions from taxpayers and to deal
with disputes on appeal. Most of these problems are manageable, but must be
thought through in a new context.
110. As an example, consider the need of establishing and maintaining the tax
roll. Some means must be developed so that both the tax administration and
withholding agents or other payers can easily identify individuals subject to the
IBDT. One way of building the required tax roll would be to obtain the relevant
information from the immigration authorities. If the IBDT were levied on all
developing country migrants, it should not be a major problem for the immigration
bureaux to produce a list of newly entering individuals subject to the tax. If,
however, the IBDT were levied, not on all developing country migrants but only on
certain categories of professionals, it might be far more difficult for the
immigration authority to verify the status of each immigrant.(See part A of the
appendix.)
111. If the tax administration is capable of identifyine the PTKs, it would be
able to send each of them information on their special tax obligations. A PTK
could also be required to inform his employer of his status for withholding
purposes.
112. As this brief description of just one aspect of the administrative problem
illustrates, the IBDT would require some changes in present developed country
practices and co-operation from the developed countries in enforcing the IBDT
with the requisite degree of vigilance.

M/ The collection of taxes by one level of the government for the benefit
of another is called "piggybacking 11 • /Provisions exist in the United States
allowing the Internal Revenue Service to collect a state's income tax as part of
its collection of the federal income tax. Due to administrative considerations,
a condition for using the "piggybacking" provisions is that the state's income
tax base conforms closely to the federal tax base, although some differences are
tolerated. These "piggybacking" provisions could be expanded to cover the IBDT
and perhaps include the types of adjustments to the tax base discussed in
Part B.l of the appendix. The IRS proposed regulations for state piggybacking
may be found at 42 Federal Register 5 1790, 29 September, 1977.
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Chapter IV
International assessment on host developed countries

113. A particularly important proposal that has received much attention in recent
debates on the brain drain concerns the levying of a special assessment on host
developed countries in recognition of the benefits that these countries derive
from the immigration of skilled manpower from the developing countries. The
rationale behind such a proposal has been rigorously advanced and discussed in
the accompanying study prepared for the UNCTAD secretariat by
Jagdish N. Bhagwati. @
Suffice it to say here tha.t the assessment would
recognize and help share the extent to which the developed countries were
enriched by the immigration of persons whose talents are in short supply in all
countries and would help to share this out. The proceeds from the assessment
would provide an additional source of revenue for the internationally sponsored
Human Resource Funds.

114. The concept itself is not a new one and would simply involve the use of
existing procedures which implement the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations on assessments through the enactment of a resolution.
115. The assessment could be designed to take into account a number of variables.
For example, the assessment could be a function of the total number of FTKs who
immigrated to the developed country, the amount of their income, the amount of
tax they paid to the developed country or the amount of their IBDT, the relative
scarcity of their skills in their developing country of origin, the amount of
education they received at developing country expense, or any other combination
of factors that ,.rould generally reflect the costs and problems of specific
developing countries as well as the enrichment of the developed countries. A§/

116. In cases wher" the assessment on host developed countries did not reflect
adequately the flow of PTKs between specific pairs of countries, bilateral
agreements could provide for additional transfers of funds. These supplementary
agreements could provide for additional transfers of funds. They would recognize
the special conditions existing between countries, or would adjust for unique
flows of PTKs among contiguous countries. International organizations, such as
the United Nations, can encourage the use of supplementary agreements by
providing the necessary technical assistance, statistical information, and moral
suasion.

!il./

TD/B/C. 6/AC .4/2, op. cit.

~ If the assessment were substantial, developed countries might be
encouraged to reduce levels of PTK immigration. Some constraints are therefore
imposed on the amount of the assessment.
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117. The admini.stra tive p:rolJlel'!'.s poeed by an -1,tssessment on host developed
countries a:re modaet in ccm.pa.:rfoon wi.th thcae encou.ntered in levying a. opecia.J.
international tax on individuals.. As en illustration, conoide:r an assessment
baaed only on the income earned by the total group cf skilled migra~ts in a boat
developed country. To compute the aeaeaament only- aggregate d.~.ta .is need.ed; euch
information can be obta.in.ed from t,<3,lllple surveys and c:ross-ecctional at-..1diea. Some
cf these atudiee have already been p:re_pe.red. by econ01nh1ts concerned with mefu.mring
the 'bra.in d:t•ain.. It ia far eeaier to upda.fo thr~se studJ.f.rn period.i.cally, e·1ot1. if
va:rlables other than income were involved, than it is to assess and colhict a tu
rumu.ally .from individ.ual skilled migrat,ta. Because the assasm&-::mt is levied on
the host developed country and not on the individual migra.""lts, ·Ir.any of the prcblema
diocusaed in chapters II and III become either ir.relf!'ll'ant or
little
5:L:!;lificance.. On the other hand. 1 it should 'ba underlined that a.n iftsue of such
major eignificn.nca will ::i:-equire tho search for soluHcns to procem1 alcmg a. :ou1rioor
of liriea i."l order to achieve the ·ol!l$t :poss:l.ble n:d.x.
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St,..uctvi:>al· j_ssues in the desi
international brain drain tax

of an
IBDT)

1.
This appendix diocm;ses three major structural issues in th~ design of an
international :::irain drain tax (IBD'r): defining the class of taxpayers subject to
the tax; choosing the rules and principles to govern the calcul?-tion of the tax
base; and selecting an appropriate set of tax rates.
The selection of these
topics is by no means exhaustive.
At this point in the evolution o.f the brain
drain proposals, it does not appear necessary to treat exhaustively and rigorously
the range of issues raised by the IBDT.
The appendix sketches the broad outlines
of the IBDT, in order to :provide a framework in which rational debate may proceed.

A.

Defining the taxpayer

2.
As originally conceived, the proposals to tax the brain drain were intended to
apply to professionals, such as scientids, doctors, and engineers.
Throughout
this study, 11 PTK" has been used to indicate generall;r this group of professionals
who are viewed as coni.prising the heart of thP. brain drain probl,:?m for most
developing countries.
A precise definition would be necessary, however, if the
term were used to define those individuals who were to be sub,ject to the IBDT.

3.

Any attempt to define PTK faces serious obstacles,
.A.lie!ls are present in the
developed co1mtries !or a multitude of reasons: some come on short business trips,
others stay for a few years to teach, ·and still others may come as students and
stay after completing their education.
Skills and jobs also come in many
packages and cio not always fit easily in defined. pigeonholes.
Lawyers,
internati..ona,l civil servants, businessmen and oth8rs may have a good deal of
flexibility in describing their jobs or skills.
Since skills e.nd jobs, as well
as reasons for bein{: in the developed c01_mtry, will vary from :1rear to year, it
would not be sufficient to d2termine an alien I s status for purposes of the IllD'11
only at the timE: of imm.:gration; this would have to 1.)e done annually.

4.
The va,riety of situations encou11tered ·poses a challenge in drafting a
workable definition of PTK.
Fine distinctions are likely to he drawn, and
considerable strain would be placed on any definition by taxpayer manoeuvres to
circumvent it.
Any wea'lmess in the definition would operate to the advantage of
the taxpayer.
5,

The alternatj_ve to defining PTK wculd be to include in the scheme all of the
developing countries 1 residents and citizens in the host developed country.§:}

a/
In order to avoid difficult determinations of resid3ncy, the IBDT might
be applied only to developing country nationals.
In man;y :.>'?.ses, the PTK will be
both a resident and a national of the same developing Muntry and ::.t will be
irrelevant whether the residency test is applied.
A difference could result,
however, in the case of som·e developing countries, such as the United Kingdom's
former colonies in Africa, \vhere the brain drain may w:msist of PTKs holding
developed country citizenship.
If desirahle, immigration authoriti8s in the
develo:9ed country could identify these cases and the determination of residency
could then be made by the tax administration.
In any case, special rules would have to be provided for persons with dual
nationalities.
If a PrK were a. national of two. developing countries, either
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Considerable advantages flow from adopting this approach.
First, it would help
the IBDT to conform as closely as.possible ,to existing ,patterns of taxation.
.An
attempt to single -out PTKs for.. special ·treatment would be. unprecedented and
perhaps conflict with international law~
J3ut. ev~n:.if this c·onflict did not
exist the singling out of PTKs.would provide a focus for public criticism _and:
would· make ·.it more difficult to obtain the. suppor,t .o:f the developed. countries and
the voluntary compliance of the PTKs., Second, levyin.gthe IBDT on all of the
developing· countriE.rn _i resid~nts and citizens in, the host developed country would
allow t.he IBDT rate to. be lowered and. still raise th!3 · saine amount of revenue as .
would a higher rate applied: only. to PTKs. . Keeping- the tax. rate low has three
major advantages: · ·(1) the emigrant .P.TK is not. likely. to engage in tax avoidance_
or ~vasion if the amount ()f. ta:x: at stake is not_ large; . (2) the P.rK 1 s decision to:
emigrate is unlikely to be. affected by a low rate, thus reducing conflict with
fundamental human rights, and (3) inequities arising from the la.ck of uniform · .
treatment of P.rKs, whether due to differences in rate structures, tax bases, and
so forth will be.less serious.

6.

For some developing .countries, n6 difference may exist between levying the·
IBDT on ali of their nationals. and residents abroad and levying the IBDT on a
smaller subset of only P.rKs.
This.would be true of developing countries whose.,
brain drain consists primarily of doctors, for ,example,' a profession that would
clea.rly·be included in all definitions of PTK.
However, other developing
countries may experience a migration of businessmen, as well ,as employees of
international agencies and multinational corporations.
These a.re the groups
that would pose difficult:definitional problems., , Yet these ,groups represent a
loss of essential operating, leadership and entrepreneurial abilities, not to
mention potential suppliers of. capital, even if they a.re not commonly perceived
of as part of the.brain drain.
Given.the rationale of the. IBDT and the .
considerations in. favour of applying the tax to all developing country residents
and nationals,. the arguments for applying. the tax only .to Pl1Ks is not persuasive.

7.
Some developing countries, howev.er ~ might object to taxing all residents
and nationals abroad, not because they are worried about reaching businessmen,
international civil servants, and. so forth, but ,because they do not want to tax
that group of unskilled or semi-skilled individuals euphemistically referred to
in Europe asguest::...workers.
An attempt to exempt this group.with a functional
definition would raise· ·many of. the problems discussed above.
A more feasible·
approach would· be to levy the IBDT only on incomes. above a certain level.
Given
normal salary differentials, it should be possible to set the level differently

nationality would be sufficient to subject him to the IBDT. • · A problem would
arise, however, if the IBDT revenues were returned to.the countries of origin,
since it would then be necessary: to· decide how.· to allocate the tax.

PT~

It will be more l~kely th~t a
~ith' di.ial natiomi,lity will .be a national
of both a developing and a developed country.
.In this case, rules would. have ·
to be provided to determine the extent to which the taxpayer would be subject to
the IBDT.
The resolution ,of this problem would·have no effect on the taxpayer's.
status wi.th respect to any 0th.er laws.
"; ' ·
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.·~:.t ,,

in each developed country ~o that~: the 1mskilled --a.nd se~i..:skilled· work~rs- would be
exempt from the tax, irrespective of whethQr it was thf::il· brawn or brain or a
combination which produced their iriccirr.e; 12/

B.

Selecting a

tax

base

'of

tax

a. Once the group
tµpayers ha$ bean defined; H is neeesGary to def:ih.e a
base; that ia, to select o·r design the .rules and principles that wi,11 .be. used.
calculating the amount of income subject to the IBD'l'.
'Fnough all countries that ~
employ an income
must develop this set of rules and principles' no
countries employ identical· approaches. . ·This result is not surprising,. .... ·: · ·::'...
cons_idering the great va:dety of ite!Tls tha.t enter in~o the calculation of the tax: ..
base: ca.pi tal gains; di videnda, interest,, royalties, deferred · c6mpensa.tion , . '
agreements, stock optionst. e.nnuities, insurance proceeds1 gifts, inhoritanc'es,'
alimony' stock redemptions,'' depreciation, t'fav,el a.rid entertainment expenses,
charitable contributions, m~dica.l cxpeiisesi: l9sse·s, .and sq forth. • .. Little .
.
agreement exists, even· in principle, · as' to ·tlie correct treatmerit of
of these
items, an'd in those cases where agreement l'l18J'_.' exist, :political, 'social and '; .
economic considerations, or e.dniiri'istra.tive. constraints lead count':ries
adopt, ' ,.
greater divergent approaches •.. Accordingly, a large number of al tc:rnat.i,"ve~ ai'E!
available for defining the ·IBDT base· and can be broken down into three major ;_ .·,.·: •
choices: using the host d~veloped country"s tax base, using the developing · ·. ·
country's tax base, or designing a special !BDT base.
·

ip ;'

two .·_... : :.

tax

many

to'

>

'.'El

Whether 'the 'i::Bn.'r:)~s applied ~ml:c to PTKs' or to al: de'velopine· countcy'
residents and nationals, some exemption si~ould be provided for individuals .
temporarily present ··in the de1ieloped count:cy. · Applying the IBDT to individuals
on a business trip to the devel'oped country, or to employee a on short-term' '
assignments is an administrative nuisance not warranted by either the small
amount of revenue at stake or the objeotivea- or the tax.-..
.:.. : ... ~/.
An exemption for short..:.te~mvisitors to the developed country can be provid,ed
by various m.echanisms. . . One approach is .to apply• the. IBDT only to. Jndividuala who.

have entered the developed country unde1· an immigration
administratively a.ttractive,sinoe·a list of ·immigrants
from the pro:per..,anthorities. · ::It is possible, howew~r,
of time in many developed countries, legally as well as

.This approach is··
should. be readily available

visa..

to spend prolonged periods
illegally, without.
.

obtaining an immigration visa.
Certainly the loss to a developing country is the
same when a doctor is ,abroad f'or·five:yeari:l, regardless of .the doctor's status ,
under developed country.immigrat.ion law.
Taxing only those holding immigration
visas is .therefore likely,. to ;-bo .too narrow an approach.

more

of

It would-be
con'sisterrt ~ith the objectives
the IBDT to dh.fine the.
exerilption in. terms· of ~he .lengt~ ,of
~il the dt>.rvoloped ·country.'_·' For example,
the IBDT might' apply if the i:ndividti.al has been present in '·the developed country.
for some miniminn period:' of timt.,/ perhaps 180 ,fays. · :By examiriing "the prior flow
of individuals' between the· developit'6' country and each developed' country, it
might be' possible" to. aeiect a,' time :t,eriocl that, eliminated 'mo·at of'.:tha nuisance.
cases from taxat·~on·; ;':. 4n<?th!'?r 'approacri fs tb Use 'the developed :country IS i rules Of
residency.
The ,develo:p~d . ' cm_mtry will normally· have .to decide· at · what point the
migrant} S presenc~ become°o 'pe:rfriariel'l:t Ot.lOUf',h tr, .warrant being ·subj_octed, to the ·., ''.
1
normal' 'develop'ed couhtcyrta.x regime
the ;IBDT can utilize the Sall'iO criteria.
The IBDT would thus apply ·whenever the migrant becai.r.e @. tax resident under"·:·

stay

and

developed country rules.

·

·
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On using the developed country's tax base

9,
Administrative considerations weigh heavily toward using the developed country
tax base.
Presumably, most PI1Ks wi11 be paying devfc:loped country taxes and will
have to determine their developed country base for this purpose.
Using the
developed country tax base for pu~poscis of tre IBDT thus imposes no additional
administrative burden on the PTK.
More important, the d2veloped co1.u1try tax
administration's normal audit and investication machinery will be enlisted
automatically on behalf of the IBDT, and contr-:wersies arising over the tax base
will be resolved through the dcv8 loped c,'.)1.mtr;y' s usual appeal procedures,
eliminating the need for any special IBDT r.1achir'.ery.
10. But not all PTKs may have to compute their developed country tax base.
For
example, employees of international organizations - a large group - are exempt
from developed country taxation.
'I1o bo sure, these persons could be required to
compute their developed country tax base for purposes of the IBDT, exactly as if
they were taxable under developed country law, but some special arrangement would
have to be made for verifying their returns since the developed country tax
administration would not be concerned with this tax-exempt group.
Alternatively,
in the case of the United Nations and other employees under the International
Civil Service, the staff assessment may be a satisfactory substitute for the
developed country base, even though it would not reach unearned or passive forms
of income such as royalties, interest and dividends.
11. Other problerr.s are presented by tax shelters and similar tax avoidance
devices that can be used in certain developed countries to reduce substantially a
taxpayer's income.
Should the developed country tax base be adjusted to eliminate
the effects of these ta}: avoidance devices?
Are there circumstances where the
PTK should pay a minimum IBDT, regardless of his developed country taxable income?
Answers to these questions will vary, depending on the type of provisions found
in each developed country's tax law.
If the developed country tax administration
is computerized, c rtain adjustments in th tax base should 1:-.: feasible.

2.

On using the developing country's tax base

12. Before adopting a form of the IBD'.r that is basically an extension of the
developing country income tax, the developing country tax base must be examined
closely to determine whether it can satisfactorily be applied to PTKs.
Since
many developing cou..ritries will have had little experience taxing individuals
abroad, the assertion of citizenship jurisdiction wi11 expose for the first time
possible weaknesses in the tax base.
13. A major question is whether the deve1oping country tax base can cope
adequately with the relativelJ sophisticated business practices and conditions in
the developed country.
Developing country tax law may offer little guidance as
to the tax consequences of transactions and practices that are common in the
developed country but unfamiliar (or perhaps illegal) in the developing country.
Certainly any grey areas or vacuums in the developing country law will be
resolved by the PTK in his favour and therefore many transactions may fail to
enter into the developing country tax base.
The developing country will have to
evolve policies for dealing with these transactions, an effort that may or may not
be justified depending on the amount of revenue at stake.
.Alternatively, it may
be possible to defer to the developed country's treatment of any item not
sufficiently dealt with by the developing country tax base, but this raises the
knotty problem of integrating developed country tax law with developing country
tax law.
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14, Additional difficulties in acco!llillodating the developing countr;:v tax base to
developed country business practices may E;ri se.
For example, some developing
countries place a cLiling on advertising, travel, or entertainment expenses.
The
ceiling is obviouily determined in the context of condi~ions prevailing in the
developing country ana may be totally unrealistic in the case of a taxpayer
working abroad.
Even when the ceilings are expressed as a percentage of income,
such as a rule limiting deductions for advertising expenses to 10 per cent of sales
revenue, the percentage may be grossly out of line ~rith developed country business
practices.
15. Other provisions in the developing country tax code may also be expressed in
absolute amounts.
To take just one exa~ple, it is cor:JIJ1on for countries to
adjust an individual's tax burden to reflect the size of his family.
A common
wa·:I of making this adjustment is to allow a deduction in a fixed a111ount for each
member of the fa.11ily.
The amount chosen, however, nay not reflect any rational
policy if the taxpayer is abroad.
16. The-developing country tax base would have to be examined to see whether
certain benefits should not be extended to PTKs abroad.
For example, many
developing countries utilize a system of generous capital allowances or investment
credits to encourage domest_ic capital investment.
At the time these benefits
were.first introduced, investment in capital assets abroad may have been uncom.'Ilon
and thus no thought was given to limiting the 1:Jenefits to only domestic investment.
A country might not wish to exte.nd these benefits to foreign investment, however.
17. On the other hand, a devel_oping country may decide to extend a special
deduction to taxpayers abroad to mitigate burdens not imposed on taxpayers within
the country, such as larger-than-normal moving expenses, or the costs of sending
children to special schools.
18. In order to pla.ce the preceding problems in perspective, it is useful to
distinguish salaried employees from pelf-emp::..oyed individuals. Advertising
deductions, travel and entertainment expenses, depreciation and investment
allowances have relativGly little impact on salaried employees, who may t.:onstitute
the heart of the brain drain for many developing countries.
To be sure, even.
these employees I'.lay pose difficulties if part of their remuneration consists of
deferred compensation agreements, profit sharing and pension plans, stock options,.
or other sophisticated fringe benefits with which the developing countries may have
little experience,

3.

Adoption of a special tax base

19, The problems ·that accompany the use of either the developed country or the
developing country tax bases can be overcome by adopting a special, independent
base for purposes of the IBDT. sJ
Indeed, even if no problems existed with
respect to. using the developi_ng country or the developed country base, a special
IBDT base is necessary in order to naintain equality of treatment among PTKs
having the same before-tax gross income.
Unless the same set of rules were used
in calculating their tax bases, PTKs having the same before-tax gross income.may
not have the same taxable income.
For example, if the developed country tax base

s./ In one sense, adjustments to the developed cou...11.try tax base of the
nature discussed in Section B.l of this appendix would be a first step toward the
design of a special IBDT base. But such adjustments would ta.1-(e as their starting
point the developed country tax base, and may therefore oe inadequate in achieving.
uniformity of treatment for· all P'I'Ks.
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is used, the calculation of taxable income will vary depending on the PTK' s host
country; if the developing tax base is used, taxable income will va:ry depending
on the P'.11K' s country of origin.
The latter result may not be- objectionable
where the IBDT is essentially an extension of the developing country income tax,
but where the IBDT revenue is earmarked for brain drain funds or other general
developmental spending, little justification exists for applying different rules
in calculating the P'.11Ks tax base.
20. Whatever merits a separate IBDT base has, ease of administration is not one of
them.
All the administrative problems identified in the tax with respect to the
use of a surtax would be greatly compounded, since no countriJ or group of persons
would have had any experience working with the new tax base.
Extensive mass
education programmes would thus be necessary to educate taxpayers and their
accountants and lawyers .
Integrating the IBDT with the developed country
withholding procedures might be formidable if the two tax bases differ greatly.
A new IBDT staff would be required to answer taxpayer questions, perform the
necessary audit, intelligence, and collection functions; some form of appeal
proceduxe would also have to be established .
21. The administrative problems caused by the use of a special IBDT base are
substantial, but not insurmountable.
The problems are similar to those faced by
Realistically,
a country when it introduces an income tax for the f irst time.
support for the IBDT will be a function of how easily the tax can be implemented
without causing major disruption or changes in existing practices .
The spectre
of a new international bureaucracy, which may be required if a special base is
used for the IBDT, would dampen the political attractiveness of the tax.
C.

Selecting a rate schedule

22. The final step in calculating the IBDT involves applying a tax rate to the
migrant's tax base.
The rate structure of the IBDT can be based on the developed
country's rate struc-!;ure, the developing cowtry 1 s rate structu:."e or can be
specially designed.
1.

Using the developed country rate schedule

23. In its simplest form, the IBDT rat es could be set at some percentage of the
developed country's tax rates.
For example , every tax rate in the developed
country schedule could be increased by 10 per cent and the increased rates applied
to the IBDT base.
24. If the developed country's tax b2.se were used as the IBDT base, (and the case
for using the developed country's rates is strongest when the developed country's
base is also used), this procedure is equivalent to a 10 per cent surtax; that
is , a 10 per cent tax levied on the developed country tax.
The PTK would
calculate his tax liability, 1L.~der the developed country's normal rules, using the
developed country's regular tax schedule; the 10 per cent IBDT would then be
applied to the developed country tax liability.
25. A major advantage of the surtax
additional tax burden imposed by the
the developed country's tax reflects
conditions in the developed country,
that the additional burden resulting

approech is that it automatically relates the
IBDT to the developed coU-.~try 1 s tax.
Since
what is regarded as e, fair tax burden given
the surtax is a convenient means of assuring
fr-0m the IBDT will not be unreasonable.

26 . The political attractiveness of the IBD'r mc"y be enhanced by the use of a
surtax, since this approach is easily understood by la;ymen.
Those concerned
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about the effect of the IBDT on an individual I s decision to migrate can easily
calculate the additional tax burden at any given income l2vel.
A surtax set at
10 per cent, for ex,,mple, should eliminate fears that the IBD'l' will curtail
migration or result in wholesale renunciations of citizenships or othe:r means of
avoiding the tax.
Moreover, because the rate would be set by an international
agency, a developing country would be powerless to use the rate as a means of
either restricting emigration or punishing those who hav2 already migrated.

27. If the surtax were a flat percentage of the develop·2d crnmtry tax, such as
10 per cent, the IBDT would mirror whatever progressivity was inherent in the
developed country rate structure.
If different degrees of progressivity were
desired, the rate of the surtax could be made a function of the developed country
tax liability.
For example, if the IBDT wanted more progressive rates than that
evidenced by the country's rates, the rate of the surtax could increase as the
amount of the developed country tax increased.
28. Administrative considerations also argue in favour of tho surtax approach.
Although not simple to administer, a surtax causes fewer problems for the developed
country's tax administration than cfo other approaches.

29. Another advantage is that. the surtax can be eadly integrated with the
assessment on the host developed country, as discussed in Chapter IV above.
For
examp1e, the assessment on the developed country could be set at a percentage
which could be greater than 100 per cent of the surtax.
Since the developed
country would have information available as to each PrK' s surtax, it should be
relatively easy to calculate j_ts a~rnessment.
If the ·surtax ':Tere the exclusive
measure of the assessment, it would elirainate the need for gathering other data.
2.

Using the develoning country's rate schodule

30. As was illustrated in the text, the developing count:;:"'J' s rate schedule might
produce unsatisfachry results if applied t8 a PTK abroad.
Tleveloping countries
commonly usE· very progressive rate structures, and a salary that appears
extravagant by developing country standards, though only adequate by devGloped
country standara_s 1 is likely to be heavily taxed.
'\.if.hen compared with living
conditions in the developed country, the developing country tax may be high
en9ugh to border on the confiscatory.
Granting a credit for the developed
country tax does not eliminate this problem, sincE· the overall burden on the PTK is
still determined by the developing country tax rate.
31. As an illustration, consider a PTK in the United States with $20,000 taxable
income, and a United States tax liability of $5,000.
Assume that the PTK's
country of origin uses a steeply progressive rate schedule.
If $20,000 is
considerGd by developing country standards to be a substantial salary, the PTK is
likely to be taxed at a very high developing country rate,
If the develpping
country tax is say, $15,000, and if a credit is granted for the devc,loped ·country
tax, the overall burden on the PTK is $15,000 ($5,000 paid to the United States
and U0,000 paid to the developing country).
When measured against other
taxpayers in thG Unit0d States the PTK 1Jears a $10,000 additional tax burden.
Expressed in percentages, the overall tax burden on the PTK represents
75 per cent of his salary, compared with a 25 per cent burden on United States
taxpayers at the same incomo level.

32. Even developing country rate schedules that were not progressive might be
-qnsatisfactory when extended to individuals abroad,
Suppose in the example
above, the developing country taxed all income a-!:- a fla,t, proportional rate of
10 per cent, so that the PrK' s develop~ng country tax was $2,000.
If the
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developing country granted a credit for the United States tax, no developing
country tax would be payable.
If no credit were given, the total burden on the
PrK would equal the sum of the developed co~try and developing country tax, or
$7,000.
The overall tax burden on the PTK would still be 40 per cent greater
than the tax burden on a United States taxpayer with a similar income, and this
must be considered harsh.
Only if the developing country tax were a small
percentage of the developed country tax, would the total burden on the PrK be
reasonable.
33. An attempt to overcome these problems could be made by developing a special
schedule for use with every host developed country.
The schedule would be
designed to generate either (a) a tax that was aluays slightly higher than the
developed country tax, assuming the developed country tax were creditablei or
(b) if the developed country tax were not creditable, a tax that was a modest
percentage, perhaps 10 per cent, of the developed country tax.
A problem arises,
however, if great disparities exist between the developed country and developing
country tax base; the greater the disparities the more difficult it becomes to
design the desired rate schedule.
To illustrate, consider a PTK with $20,000
income, as determined under developed country rules, and a resulting $5,000
developed country tax liability.
Assuming no credit were to be given for the
developed 9ountry tax, a satisfactory developing country rato schedule would
generate a tax of, perhaps, $500.
But the PTK's income, as calculated under
developing country rules, mi.eht be. more or less than $20,000, and this makes
designing the desired rate schedule difficult.
A further complication is
introduced, since a second P-rK, also having $20,000 under developed country rules,
would not necessarily have the same income as the first PTK, when calculated
under developing country rules.
Only _i.f both had identical sources of income,
identical expenses, and so forth would their developing country tax base be the
same.
34. Designing a satisfactory developing country schedule will be easiest when the
developing and devc:ioped country bases are ,;imila:r; but the reater the similarity
the more closely this approach becomes to the surtax.

3.

A specially designed IBDT rate schedule

35. Regardless of whether the developed or the developing country rates are used,
the IBD'r paid by PrKs at the same. income level (putting aside, for the moment,
the question of which rules will govern the calculation of the- PTK 1 s income) will
vary.
If the ~eve loped country rates are used, the IBDT will be the same for all.
PTKs at the same income level within the developed country, but will be different
for PTKs at the same incom~ level in other developed countries.
If the developing
c01mtry tax rat~s are used, the IBD'l' will be the same for all PrKs of that
developing country, at the same income level, regardless of which developed country
they were in, but would be different for PTKs at the same income level who come
from other developing countries.
These differences might be acceptable if the
IBDT were an extension of the developing 9ountry income tax, but if the tax
proceeds were earmarked for IHR.Fs or other developmental purposes, the amount
paid by PTKs at the same income level should not be a function of their
developing country of origin or of their host developed country.
Eliminating
these differences in order to attain more uniform treatment of PTKs can be
accomplished through the use of a special IBTIT rate schedule.
36. To illustrate the options avaj__lable in designing this special rate schedule,
consider t,..,o PTKs working in the United States and the United Kingdom respectively.
Assume both PrKs have th\3 same income, lJut that the United Kingdom tax is.
US$2,000 and the United States tax is US$750.
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(a)

Option 1:

The IBDT is set well below either the United Kingdom or the
United States tax

37. The rat.e schedv:.'? could be desig:ied so :1a.t for any given ..i.ncome level, the
IBDT will be substantially below either the United States or the United Kingdom
tax.
For the PTKs under consideration, the IBDT ·tax rate might be designed to
pro.duce a US$50 tax.
Both PTKs would pay this in addition to their normal
United States and· United Kingdo1n. taxes.
Because the IBDT burden is modest, no
adjus~ment in their developed country taxes is necessary.
Both PTKs pay the same
absolute amount of IBDT, al though e·xpressed as a percentage of their respective
developed country ta.."'{es, the additional burden on the United Kingdom PTK is higher.
Since for him, the IBDT is equivalent to a 2,5 per cent surtax, compared with a
6.67 per cent surtax for the United States.
(b)

0-ption 2:

Ths IBDT io set at a level between the United States and the
United Kingdom tax

38, Suppose an IB])T rate were desigrwd to generate a US$1,250 ta.."'{,
Unlike
option J., where the tax was substantially below either the United States or the
United Kingdom tax:, and therefore imposed on1y a modest additional tax burden on
the PTKs (6.67 per cent in the c2.se of the United States Pl'K and 2.5 per cent in
the case of the United Kingdom PTK), here the additional burder.. is significant and
cannot be ignored.
Some adjustment would be required in order to accommodate the
IBDT.
The United States end the United Kingdom could, for example, grant a credit
for the IBDT.
In the case of the United. Ste.tes PTK, the credit for US$1, 250 would
exceed the United States tax lie.bilitiJ of US$7~0 and no further United ·States tax- would
be due.
The United Kingdom PTK would pay the United Kingdom US$750, the difference
'between the United Kingdom tax and the IB])T (US$2,000 - US$1,250).

39. Option 2 satisfies the objective of equalizing the IBDT paid by PTKs at the
same income level and has the further advantage of generating more revenue than
Option 1.
The higher levGl of revenue is 11accE, possible by the credit provided by
the developed cmmtri '3.
By agreeing to ere·· it the IBDT again: '·, domestic tax,
the United Kingdom ano the United St2,tes forn.e;o the amoux1ts of tax they would
otherwise have collected - US$1,250 and US$750 respectively.
This amount can
properly be viewed as a form of developed country assessment and could be
.creditable against any other host developed country assessment that might be levied.
The revenue potential of Option 2 is not unlimited; as a practical matter, the
IBDT rate cannot be set very much higher than the United States rate, regardless
of the credit, without the total burden on the PTK becoming excessive.
40. Despite the attractiveness of the increased revenue under Option 2, some
unfairness may be perceived because the IBDT v:ill impose an additional burden on
only the United States P1K.
The United Kingdom PTK pays the same overall tax
burden, US$2,000, both before and after implementation of the IB])T,
The
United States PTK, on the other hand, experiences a US$500 increase in his overall
burden after tlw IBDT is introduced,
The preceding examples considered two PTKs at the same income level without
specifying which rules were to govern the calculation of their tax base.
It
would be consistent with the goal of maintaining international norms to levy the
IBDT on its own, specially developea. tax base, as was discussed in Part B of this
appendix.
However realistic it may be for the IBDT to develop its own tax base
over the long-term, in the short-term it will be :necessary to use either the
developing country or the developed c01mtry base.
For the :reasons discussed in
L,l.
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Part B, the developed country tax base is the more suitable candidate.
Indeed,
when the objective is to compare PTKs at the same incone level, the developed
country base is especially attractive because more similarity is likely to exist
among developed country tax bases than is true of developing country bases.
In
other words, if the incomes of identically situated PTKs were calculated uncler the
rules of various developed countries, more uniforr.ii ty in the results is _to be
expected the.n if the incomes were calculated under various developing cour1try rules.
Therefore, it iG more meaningful for the IBDT to corapare J?TKs at the same income
level when their incomes are calculated u,~der the various developed country rules,
rather than under the various developing country rules.

